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ARTICLE
THE SELECTIVE FUNDING PROBLEM:
ABORTIONS AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Michael W McConnell*
Selective governmentalfunding impinging upon controversial but constitutionally protected activities raises difficult doctrinal issues. In this Article,
ProfessorMcConnell challenges readers across the political spectrum by comparing and contrastingthe constitutionalimplications of governmentalfunding policies regardingabortions and religious schools. Perceiving that ideology rather than consistent methodology now governs the constitutionality
of selective governmentalfunding, he applies parallel argumentation to analyze governmental decisions to grant or withhold direct and indirect aid for

these protected choices. Recognizing that religion and abortion stir strong
emotions in the hearts of many, Professor McConnell concludes by offering
a theory of selective governmental funding that could promote dispassionate
decisionmaking and more predictable results.

T

HE government cannot spend money on everything. It must be
selective. But selective funding raises problems, especially when
it influences citizens in their exercise of constitutionally protected
choices. Then, the politics of spending become inflamed with the
rhetoric of constitutional rights. In recent decades, the most protracted and intense of these disputes have involved funding of abortions and of religious schools.
These two issues, abortion funding and religious education funding, seem to pose the same question of constitutional law: when is the
government's refusal to fund a constitutionally protected choice an
impermissible "burden" on the exercise of the right? In both cases,
the Constitution protects the right to decide for oneself - whether to
have an abortion or to carry the child to term, and whether to obtain
a religious or a secular education for one's children. And in both
cases, the government funds one alternative and not the other: the
Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Act prohibits the use of federal
funds to perform abortions,' and a series of Supreme Court decisions,
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes to thank Albert
Alschuler, Mary Becker, Lloyd Cohen, Judge Frank Easterbrook, Clarke Forsythe, Charles
Fried, Stephen Gilles, Abner Greene, Larry Kramer, Douglas Laycock, William Marshall,
Thomas McAffee, Mary McConnell, Michael Perry, Judge Richard Posner, Daniel Ritchie,
Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, Diane Wood, and participants in the Legal Theory Workshop
at Stanford Law School for helpful comments on an earlier draft as well as the James H.
Douglas, Jr., Fund and the Kirkland & Ellis Professorship for financial support during the
preparation of this Article.
1 The Hyde Amendment has been reenacted each year since 1976 as a rider to the Department
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proof which Lemon v. Kurtzman 2 is the most prominent, effectively
3
hibit the use of government funds for religious schools.
More interestingly, the arguments made by proponents of abortion
funding and religious education funding are essentially the same. For4
example, Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Harris v. McRae
argues that it is unconstitutional for Congress to refuse to fund abortions when under Medicaid it funds live births. His argument can
easily be transposed into an argument that it is unconstitutional for
the government to refuse to fund religious schools when it funds
secular schools:
A poor woman [with school-age children] confronts two alternatives:
she may elect either to [send them to secular schools] or to [send them
to religious schools]. In the abstract, of course, this choice is hers
alone, and the Court rightly observes that [Lemon] "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to [send her
children to religious school]." But the reality of the situation is that
[Lemon] has effectively removed this choice from the indigent woman's
hands. By funding all of the expenses associated with [secular education] and none of the expenses incurred in [religious education], the
Government literally makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot
afford to refuse . . . [M]any poverty-stricken women will choose to
[send their children to secular schools] simply because the Government
provides funds for [this], even though these same women would have
chosen [religious schools] if the Government had also paid for that
option, or indeed if the Government had stayed out of the picture
5
altogether and had defrayed the costs of neither ....
Justice Brennan, of course, would reject the argument as it applies to
school funding. But he has never explained why.
of Health and Human Services appropriation bill. For a recent version, see Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
of i9go, Pub. L. No. ioi-i66, § 204, 103 Stat. 1159, 1177 (i989), which provides that "[nione
of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term." Id. In the version before
the Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (198o), the Hyde Amendment also permitted the
use of federal funds for abortions if the pregnancy had been caused by rape or incest that had
been reported promptly to the authorities. See id. at 302.
2 403 U.S. 602 (i97i).
3 The religious school funding cases are vastly more complicated than this simple description
implies, but those complications do not affect the analysis here. For more detailed descriptions
and analyses of the cases, see Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, i985 SuP. CT.
REv. 61; McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405;

McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. i, 25-26 (i989); and McKeever, "Forbidden Fruit": Governmental Aid to Nonpublic
Education and the PrimaryEffect Test Under the Establishment Clause, 34 VILL. L. REV. 1079
(1989).
4 448 U.S. 297 (i98o).

5 Id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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By the same token, Professor Mark Tushnet has observed:
[Conservatives] 'make the argument that aid to religion is constitutionally required only in the context of aid to nonpublic schools, where
they characterize the denial of aid as the imposition of a penalty on
parents who choose to exercise their constitutional right to send their
children to nonpublic schools. (As far as I know, conservatives are
not embarrassed in making this argument and simultaneously supporting the Court's decision in [Harris], that government is not required to provide public assistance to needy women
who want to
6
exercise their constitutional right to have abortions.)
Any embarrassment from the inconsistency of positions should be felt
on both sides, because virtually everyone who supports funding of
abortions opposes funding of religious schools, and virtually everyone
who supports funding of religious schools opposes funding of abortions. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, for most people,
these positions are driven more by relative enthusiasm for or hostility
to the underlying rights than by a principled understanding of the
relation between these rights and government funding.
The Supreme Court's resolution of the two problems has been
almost consistent on the surface. It has held in Harris, among other
cases, that the government is not required to fund abortions even
when it funds live births. 7 And it has held in Lemon, among other
cases, that the government is not required (indeed, it is forbidden) to
fund religious schools even when it funds secular schools. 8 The superficial similarity in result between Harris and Lemon, however,
masks a deep dissatisfaction among the Justices with these results.
The liberal bloc believes that Harriswas wrong and that Lemon was
right, while the conservative bloc believes that Harris was right and
Lemon wrong. 9 With the departure of Justice Powell, there may be
no Justice on the Court who now agrees with both lines of cases.
6 Tushnet, Religion and Theories of ConstitutionalInterpretation,33 Loyt. L. Rnv. 221, 228
n.27

(2987).

7See Harris, 448 U.S. at 326-27; accord Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., iog S.
Ct. 3040, 3050-53 (1989) (plurality opinion); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (i98o);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 5,9, 521 (,977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
8 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625; accord Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985);
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1985). Harris and Lemon are not,
of course, exactly parallel. Harris holds that the government is not required to fund abortions when it funds childbirth, whereas Lemon holds that the government is forbidden to fund
religious schools even though it funds secular schools. Lemon has two aspects: an explicit
"establishment" holding that the Constitution forbids the government from funding reli-gious
schools and an implicit "free exercise" holding that this selective funding does not violate the rights of religious adherents who include religious education as part of their exercise
of religion.
9 justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented in relevant part in Harris
and Webster but joined the majority in the most recent religious school aid cases, Aguilar and
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In this Article, I present the strongest possible argument for each
of the logical positions: abortions must be funded but not religious
schools, abortions and religious schools must both be funded, neither
abortions nor religious schools need be funded, and religious schools
must be funded but not abortions. At each juncture, I maintain
parallelism in the arguments pertaining to the two rights. By considering the issues together, I hope to mitigate the tendency, in myself
as well as others, to approach the problem of selective funding by
reasoning backward from a desired result. The analysis is intended
to cast light both on the general question of selective funding and on
the substantive constitutional law of abortion and religious education.
In discussing public funding of abortions, I treat the constitutional
right to abortion as given, notwithstanding my own opinion that Roe
v. Wade' 0 was wrongly decided. None of my arguments depend on
rejection of the abortion right or on hostility to the exercise of that
right. Similarly, though less controversially, I treat the decision
whether to incorporate a religious element in the education of one's
children as constitutionally protected. The Court formally recognized
this right in Pierce v. Society of Sisters." As a doctrinal matter, I
treat this as a free exercise right (following the Supreme Court's
characterization in 197312) rather than as a substantive due process
right, which was the doctrinal basis in Pierce prior to "incorporation"
of the free exercise clause against the states.
Analysis of selective funding problems must include two elements:
first, a careful consideration of the nature of the constitutional right
implicated by the funding decision, including the nature of the countervailing interests of the government; and, second, a general theory
to identify when rights are threatened by selective funding. The most
prominent argument for the constitutional rights of abortion and religious education is what I call the "privacy-separation rationale": that
the government is not permitted to interfere with fundamentally pri-

Grand Rapids. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
voted to uphold the abortion funding restrictions in Webster, then-Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor dissented in relevant part in Aguilar and Grand Rapids, and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy have signaled their agreement. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 624
(1988) (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Souter has not taken a position.
10 41o U.S. 113 (i973).
11 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce also recognized a right to send one's child to a nonreligious
private school, namely a military academy. See id. at 535. That is obviously not a free exercise
right, and any discussion of that right is beyond the scope of this Article.
12See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (i973). Even after Employment Division v. Smith, iIo S. Ct. 1595 (iggo), which severely curtailed protections under
the free exercise clause, parents' free exercise right to "'direct the religious upbringing of their
children'" remains of the highest order and overrides even "a neutral, generally applicable
regulatory law" to the contrary. Id. at i6oi & n.i (quoting and reaffirming Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
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vate choices regarding abortion and religion. The bulk of the Article
-

Part I -

analyzes the funding question from this perspective.

In canvassing the four logical funding positions under this perspective, I proceed progressively. In section A, I address and reject
the argument that the existence of the establishment clause, together
with the lack of any corresponding provision regarding abortion, supports denying funding to religious schools but not denying funding for
abortion. In section B, I draw a distinction between a mere failure
to fund and the decision to fund one of two mutually exclusive alternative choices and argue that selective funding poses a constitutional
problem only in the latter instance. This distinction forms part of a
general theory of selective funding and leads to the temporary conclusion that both Harrisand Lemon are wrong. In section C, I reconsider
this conclusion in light of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, from the points of view of both the aid recipient and the
taxpayer. This analysis suggests that Harris and Lemon are correct,
because both are entirely consistent with the underlying theory of the
constitutional rights. Finally, in section D, I show that even when a
selective refusal to fund is otherwise constitutional (because of the
nature of the underlying right), a program of taxation and selective
spending may nonetheless be unconstitutional if it penalizes individuals for exercising their constitutional rights. Under this standard,
Harris is right and Lemon is wrong, because those who obtain an
abortion remain entitled to a package of benefits equal in value to
those given to persons who do not obtain an abortion, but those who
choose to incorporate a religious element in their children's education
forfeit the benefit of funding for secular aspects of education as well.
In Part II, I extend the analysis of Part I to religious and abortion
counseling and to the use of governmental facilities for religion and
abortion. This analysis suggests that even if Harris and Lemon are
correct, the extension of those holdings in later cases may not be.
In Part mI1,
I reconsider the previous analysis under two alternative
conceptions of the constitutional rights involved. The "anti-coercion"
rationale posits that the constitutional rights to abortion and religious
schooling limit governmental means but not governmental ends: while
the government may not use its coercive powers to override individual
choices regarding abortion and religious education, it may use noncoercive means to influence those choices. Under this rationale, both
Harris and Lemon seem clearly correct. 13 The "equal protection"
rationale holds that these constitutional rights are best understood as
protecting historically subordinated groups (women and members of
minority religions) from governmental action that will perpetuate and
exacerbate their condition of subordination. Under this conception,
13That is, Lemon's implicit rejection of the free exercise claim to funding is correct.
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both Harrisand Lemon are more difficult to defend (Lemon even more
so than Harris), though the correct outcomes remain debatable.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that a general theory of selective
funding is vital to an intermediate jurisprudence of constitutionalism
in the context of an activist state, lest the expanded powers of government obliterate the boundaries of constitutionally defined liberties.
I.

UNDER THE PRIVACY-SEPARATION RATIONALE

The constitutional recognition of abortion rights and of the free
exercise of religion have this in common: both are responses to fundamental differences of opinion about matters deeply important to the
individual. Some persons believe that abortion is murder; some believe it is an essential element of a woman's self-governance and wellbeing; and some take positions in between. Similarly, some persons
believe that the source of ultimate value and authority is God made
incarnate in Jesus Christ; some worship a different God; some believe
in no God at all; and some are indifferent and consider the whole
question of religion a waste of time. Few who care about these issues
concede to the democratic majority the moral authority to resolve
their differences. 14 The theory underlying both Roe and the free
exercise clause is that the best solution to the dissension is to "privatize" the decision - that is, to vest the decision in the individual and
to grant the collectivity no say in the matter. In both contexts, this
approach respects autonomy in an area important to individual identity and keeps the peace. While there are other plausible conceptions
of the constitutional rights recognized in Roe and Pierce, this is the
most prominent.
Decisions involving abortion must therefore be predicated on governmental agnosticism about the morality or immorality of abortion
that is, of the moral-scientific status of the fetus or unborn child. Is
Government cannot act on the presupposition that the fetus or unborn
child is a human life deserving protection, and it cannot act on the
presupposition that the fetus is subhuman and therefore fair game for
14In the political climate since Roe, opponents of abortion have tended to support returning
the issue to the state governments, but in most cases this is no more than a tactical judgment.
If a fetus is a person, majoritarian government has no right to refuse to extend protection to it.
See Finnis, NaturalLaw and the Rights of the Unborn, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
1S5, iig (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham eds. z987); Noonan, The Root and Branch of
Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 679 (1984). The principled argument for returning the

issue to the states is based, like Roe itself, on "agnosticism" about the moral-legal status of the
fetus or unborn child. It holds that our decentralized, state-by-state political process is the best
available means for reaching a broadly satisfactory and peaceful compromise on this explosive
question.

15By "agnosticism" I mean the position that the government itself does not and cannot
know. I do not mean the position that no one can know.
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extermination. Difficult though it may be to maintain this posture of
agnosticism, it is the core of the decision in Roe:
Texas urges that... life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest
in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve
the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable

to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development 16
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.
Thus, Roe holds that the respect that is due unborn life is a controversial matter, which the Constitution leaves to the conscience of each
pregnant woman with respect to the fetus she is carrying.
The privacy logic of Roe thus has two sides. If decisions about
abortion must be "private," it follows that the government must neither compel nor forbid, encourage nor discourage, subsidize nor penalize, the practice of abortion. Government must keep its hands off.
While the government must not interfere with the rights of those who
choose an abortion, it must also recognize that opposition to abortion
is based on a conscientious conviction that abortion is the taking of
innocent life, a conviction not bigoted but deserving of equal respect. 17
This posture is for all practical purposes identical to the posture
toward religion prescribed by the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment. The government may not legislate on
the presupposition that religion in general, or any religion in particular, is correct or salutary, nor on the belief that religion is false or
pernicious. Religious truths are controversial propositions, which the
Constitution leaves to the conscience of each person. The government's sole involvement with religion is to accord equal respect for
the religious (and anti-religious) convictions its citizens hold. This
posture is sometimes called "separation" because the religious sphere
is distinguished and separated from the sphere of governmental authority. Is It might as easily be called "privacy" in the same sense that
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, i59 (i973).
The significance of this "agnosticism" is best seen by contrasting the position of government
toward abortion as defined in Roe with the position of government toward racial discrimination.
Just as the government must not interfere with abortion rights, it must not discriminate on the
basis of race. But the government has no obligation to remain "agnostic" about racial discrimination or to accord respect to racism. The government may - subject to the limits of other
constitutional provisions - use its full powers to eradicate racism in our society.
1 As an attempt to encapsulate the entire principle of church-state relations, the term
'separation" can often be misleading. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP.
CT. REv. 1,13-14; McConnell, Why "Separation"Is Not the Key to Church-State Relations,
Christian Century, Jan. i8, 1989, at 43. Here, it is used in its most normative, attractive sense,
16
17

as suggesting that religion must be autonomous and independent of government -

not in its
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the abortion right is a right of "privacy."19 The "separation of church

and state" is thus parallel to "privacy" in Roe because both conceptions
involve a metaphorical wall between the public and the private
spheres and protect decisionmaking autonomy on the "private" side of
the wall. The similarity in the popular conceptions of the two rights
is further corroborated by the common use of the term "choice" in the
rhetoric of advocates for both causes. "Educational choice" is a short-

hand expression for non-discriminatory funding of public and private
education. "Pro-choice" means support for abortion rights.

A. Harris Is Wrong; Lemon Is Right
Some will quickly dismiss any analogy between the abortion and
religious education funding questions on the basis of the constitutional
text. The first amendment comprises both free exercise and nonestablishment, thereby binding the government to a form of neutrality:
the government may "neither advanced nor inhibit[]" the practice of
religion.2 0 This means that the government may not impose burdens
or "penalties" on the exercise of religion (without a compelling governmental justification) or offer inducements or "subsidies." 2 1 If funding of religious schools is a "subsidy" of religion, it is therefore barred
by the establishment clause. Indeed, the only explanation ever provided by the Supreme Court for the constitutionality of denying funding to otherwise eligible educational institutions solely because these
schools also express religious opinions (one sentence in one opinion)
was that the establishment clause overrides any free exercise right to

more rigid and formalistic sense, in which it can resemble an ideological preference for secularism
over religion in the public sphere.
19 Indeed, the Court has used the same language of "privacy" in both contexts. Compare
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 ("The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for
the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice . . . ." (emphasis added)) with
Roe, 410 U.S. at 254 ("[Tlhe right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision .
(emphasis added)).
20 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
21 On the idea of a "burden" under the free exercise clause, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin:
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989); and
McConnell & Posner, supra note 3, at 38-45. The concepts of penalty and subsidy are notoriously slippery. See Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 1o2 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1433-42
(i989); Sunstein, Why the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 7o B.U.L. REV. 593, 6o-o4 (iggo).
However, they can be given reasonably workable and consistent definitions. See Baker, The
Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1185, 1246-57 (I99o); McConnell, UnconstitutionalConditions: Unrecognized Implications
for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255, 261-63 (I989). There is no need to
define these terms precisely here in order to demonstrate that Harrisand Lemon use irreconcilable
definitions.
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equal treatment for religious speech. 2 2 By contrast, there is no constitutional provision forbidding government subsidy ("advancement")
of abortions. Roe prohibits governmental burdens or penalties on the
decision to abort, but says nothing about subsidies. This fact alone,
some may say, is sufficient to explain why Lemon is right even if
Harris is not.
Yet while this position is virtually the conventional wisdom among
liberal academics, it is the least intellectually persuasive of the four
positions. It has two separate and independent analytical flaws: (i) it
rests on an interpretation of Roe that is pro-abortion rather than prochoice; and (2) it assumes that the same policy constitutes unconstitutional "aid" in one context and neutral treatment in the other.
i. The "Establishment"Dimension of Roe. - The argument that
Harris is wrong and Lemon is right depends on the assumption that
the privacy-separation rationale of Roe lacks an "establishment" component. But the most straightforward reading of Roe is that the right
of "privacy" forbids the use of tax monies to subsidize abortions no
less than, and for the same reason that, the freedom of religion forbids
the use of tax monies for the teaching of religion.
The abortion rights position is said to be "pro-choice" and not
"pro-abortion." This must mean that the government is not entitled
to favor or promote abortion, any more than it may punish or discriminate against it. Everyone would agree that the theory of Roe
would prevent the government from "establishing" abortion by requiring it. If the decision to abort or give birth is "private" - if it
is entrusted to the pregnant woman - then the government is no less
disabled from forcing than from preventing an abortion. 23 Critics of
22 See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (recognizing tension
between the religion clauses but maintaining that the establishment clause prevents the government from aiding religious schools). Why the establishment clause takes precedence in this
context is unexplained; most cases go the other way. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 627-29 (1978) (recognizing that the free exercise right of a minister to participate in politics
overrides any establishment clause concern to avoid religious power in government); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (holding that the free exercise clause requires a state to
provide unemployment benefits for those out of work for religious but not secular reasons); see
also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. i, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that
the Court has permitted benefits that would otherwise be forbidden under the establishment
clause because they "were designed to alleviate government intrusions that might significantly
deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause").
Professor Laurence Tribe has concluded that "the free exercise principle should be dominant
when it conflicts with the anti-establishment principle." L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 14-8, at 1201 (2d ed. 1988).
23 To be sure, the Court in Roe did not address this question. Indeed, the opinion approvingly cited Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the infamous decision approving involuntary
sterilization. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, r54 (i973). If Buck is good law, maybe forced
abortions would be constitutional as well. But if one treats the citation of Buck as thoughtless,
it seems far more consistent with the theory of Roe to hold that the government can neither
prevent nor require abortion.
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Harris are quick to conclude that what the government may not
prevent it also may not discourage. 24 Presumably that proposition is
symmetrical. If the government may not require abortion, why is it
not also prohibited from encouraging abortion? If abortion is a "private" decision resting on controversial moral judgments beyond the
legitimate reach of government, the Constitution must forbid government-funded grantees from counseling, encouraging, or promoting
abortion, 25 just as it forbids government-funded teachers from pro26
moting religion.
It is but a short step to add that the government may not force
anyone to perform or assist in abortions. Why, then, may the government coerce objectors (or, indeed, agnostics on the issue) into supporting abortions through their tax dollars? And if the government
cannot offer to pay people to attend church, why can it offer to pay
them to perform abortions? A "pro-choice" conception of abortion
rights has an "establishment" as well as a "free exercise" dimension,
just like the freedom of religion.
It does not necessarily follow from the "establishment" dimension
of Roe, however, that the nondiscriminatory funding of both childbirth
and abortion is an unconstitutional favoring of abortion - any more
than the nondiscriminatory funding of religious and secular education
is necessarily an unconstitutional favoring religion. My point is just
that there is no reason to distinguish Harris from Lemon on this
ground. If Lemon is right, and funding for religious schools is an
unwarranted advancement of religion, then abortion funding is likewise unconstitutional and the Hyde Amendment is constitutionally
compelled.
2. Inconsistent Definitions of "Subsidy." Even assuming, however, that "the government obviously has the constitutional authority
. * .to make abortion available at no charge to the woman, '2 7 the
mere existence of the establishment clause still provides no coherent
basis for contending that Harris is wrong but that Lemon is right.
Under this assumption, the Constitution would still demand that the
following principles govern religion and abortion rights:
Religion: Government may neither penalize nor subsidize the exercise of religion.
Abortion: Government may not penalize the exercise of abortion
rights, but the decision whether to subsidize is within the legislative
24 See, e.g., Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment
Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 113, 1117-18 (198o).

2SSee Project Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. §§ 59. -59.17 (99o).
26 See infra pp. 1023-25.

27 Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: InalienableRights, Affirmative Duties, and the
Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330, 336 (1985) (emphasis in original).
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discretion (so long as the refusal to subsidize is not in substance a
penalty).
Although the principles are different, the definitions of the terms
(penalty, subsidy) must not be.
To contend that Harris is wrong must mean that the denial of
funding is a penalty on the exercise of the abortion right if the government funds childbirth. Using "penalty" consistently, this means
that the denial of funding to religious schools must also be a penalty
on the exercise of religion if the government funds secular schools.
Therefore, if Harris is wrong, governmental funding of religious
schools would not "subsidize" those schools; rather, such funding
would be required to avoid penalizing those who exercise their rights.
As Professor William Marshall has commented, "[i]f the government's
refusal to grant a benefit to religious organizations that it provides to
nonreligious groups is construed as a penalty, it would suggest that
the granting of that benefit to religious organizations could not be
considered aid." 28 Thus, if Harris is wrong, Lemon must also be
wrong.
To contend that Lemon is right must mean that funding religious
schools is a subsidy to religion, even if equal funding is given to
secular schools. Using "subsidy" consistently, this means that funding
abortions must be a subsidy to abortion, even if the government also
funds childbirth. Thus, if Lemon is right, Harris must also be right,
because under the principles outlined above, there is no constitutional
requirement that the government subsidize abortions. The government's refusal to fund religious schools does not burden the exercise
of religion - nothing prevents parents from purchasing a religious
education for their children (other than a shortage of resources, for
which the government is not responsible). By the same token, the
government's refusal to fund abortions imposes no obstacle to purchasing an abortion with one's own resources.
To put it another way, if Harris is wrong, the denial of funding
is equivalent to a penalty on the exercise of the right, which means
that there is a constitutional right to funding of parochial education;
and if Lemon is right, funding is a subsidy, which is forbidden in the
religious context but relegated to legislative discretion in the abortion
context. Using consistent definitions of the terms "penalty" and "subsidy," there is no noncontradictory analysis that yields the conclusion
that Harris is wrong and Lemon is right.
Perhaps the mistake in the preceding analysis is the exclusive focus
on the effects of the funding decision on the individuals who exercise
the right. It is true that without considering subsidizing or penalizing
28 Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions: The Example of
the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 243, 245 (1989).
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effects, the Court has invalidated some forms of assistance to religious
schools simply because it feared "excessive entanglement" between
church and state. 29 But the "entanglement" notion is not independent
of the "subsidy" notion: the only forms of entanglement that the Court
has found to warrant a finding of unconstitutionality occur when "the
very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion
renders the statute invalid. "30 In cases in which the Court concludes
that aid to religious institutions is not and cannot be a subsidy to
religion, any remaining entanglement is insufficient to invalidate the
program. 3 1 If the subsidy holdings of the parochial school cases are
reversed, the entanglement holdings would follow automatically.
Without censorship of religious teaching, the entanglement entailed
by governmental funding of religious schools would be no greater than
the entanglement already entailed by accreditation. Whatever may
be the proper role of "entanglement" in establishment clause analysis,
it does not provide an independent justification for denying equal
treatment to schools on the basis of religious teaching and thus cannot
explain the difference between Harris and Lemon.
B. Harris and Lemon Are Both Wrong
i. The Harris Opinion. - It is no wonder that critics have found
the Court's opinion in Harris so unpersuasive. The opinion contains
two key arguments, neither of which is satisfactory under the privacyseparation rationale of Roe. First, the opinion claims that the constitutional freedom recognized in Roe does not prevent the state "from
making 'a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and...
implement[ing] that judgment by the allocation of public funds.' 3 2
That statement contradicts the central understanding of the abortion
right under the privacy-separation rationale. Under that rationale,
the issue of abortion is none of the government's business; the abortion
decision is committed to the conscience of each pregnant woman with
regard to the fetus she is carrying. To say that the government may
make a "value judgment" about the decision violates the privacyseparation premise, just as it would contradict the premise of the free
exercise clause to say that the government may make a "value judgment" supporting Christianity over Judaism and "implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds."
29 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (i985).
30 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988).

-3 See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 & n.5 (1986)
(finding it unnecessary to address "entanglement" from nondiscriminatory funding of vocational
education for blind persons in religious or nonreligious colleges in absence of a trial record);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (r983) (finding no excessive entanglement from administration of tuition tax credits).
32 Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
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The second and principal argument in Harris,repeated in different
words for several pages, is that the abortion right recognized in Roe
"does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that freedom." 33 "A refusal to fund
protected activity, without more," the Court said, "cannot be equated
with the imposition of a 'penalty."' 3 4 These statements, while true,
are beside the point, for the claimants in Harris asserted no such
"entitlement." Their claim was that the government could not fund
childbirth while refusing to fund abortion. Their objection was not
to a lack of funding, but to selective funding - funding of only one
of the two mutually exclusive alternatives, when the choice between
them is constitutionally vested in the individual. The Harris opinion
failed to address that argument.
2. The Funding of Substitutes. When, if ever, is the government
required to provide the material resources necessary for the exercise
of a constitutional right? The HarrisCourt is surely correct that there
is no such general obligation. For the most part, constitutional rights
are limitations on the power of government to disturb private rights,
not entitlements to governmental assistance. 35 The government may
not interfere with my right to operate a newspaper, but it is not
obligated to buy one for me. The government may not interfere with
my right to travel, but it need not pay for my ticket. The only cases
in which the Court has recognized an affirmative right to governmental assistance have been in the context of criminal prosecutions, in
which the Court held that access to lawyers, trial transcripts, or other
resources needed for a successful defense was part of the due process
required before the government can take away the liberty of the
accused, 3 6 or when the government is responsible for the individual's
37
inability to take care of himself.
It is insufficient to show that, on the margin, some persons will
not exercise a constitutional right in the absence of funding that they
would exercise if funding were provided. 38 If that were sufficient to

33 Id. at 318.
34 Id. at 317 n.29.
35 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989).

36 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (x963); Griffin v. Illinois, 35, U.S. 12 (1956).

Although Griffin and Douglas invoked the

equal protection clause, the more apt doctrinal basis is due process. See Lassiter v. Department
of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-33 (ig8i); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 6o9-ix (i974).
37 See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-2oo; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (976)

(holding that the government must provide medical care to incarcerated prisoners); Katcoff v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the government must provide chaplains
to military personnel).
38 Professor Kathleen Sullivan's test for conditions that require strict constitutional scrutiny
thus seems overbroad. She contends that the courts should strictly scrutinize "any government
benefit condition whose primary purpose or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about
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establish a constitutional violation, every failure to fund would be
unconstitutional, a result that is highly implausible and out of keeping
with our liberal Constitution. Thus, the obvious facts that fewer
women will have abortions under the Hyde Amendment than if the
government paid for them, and that fewer children will attend religious schools under Lemon than under a regime of equal funding, do
not alone establish constitutional violations.
Nor, from the perspective of the rights of abortion and free exercise, does it matter that the affected persons may be indigent. Failure
to fund inevitably will cause a change in decisions on the margin, no
matter how wealthy the affected individuals may be. The indigent
are more vulnerable to financial pressure, but this is only a matter of
degree. If the Hyde Amendment or the refusal to fund parochial
schools violates the abortion right or the free exercise clause as applied
to the indigent, they are no less unconstitutional as applied to everyone
else. 39 Moreover, if the indigent have a special claim on governmental

resources as a matter of constitutional law, 40 that claim must extend
as a logical matter to many more items than abortions and religious
schools and must be based on an expansive reading of the equal
protection clause rather than on the abortion right or the free exercise
clause.
But one can concede that there is no general constitutional obligation on the part of government to provide the resources necessary
to exercise a constitutional right (even to the indigent), without conceding the further proposition that the government can direct tax
monies to those who exercise their rights in one way while denying
funds to those who exercise their rights in another way. Selective
funding, as opposed to a mere failure to fund, creates incentives to
forgo a constitutional right that would not otherwise be present.
In a sense, every refusal to fund is a form of selective funding, if
the government engages in any spending at all. But it does not
pressure the right to an abortion for the government to pay for police
protection (even if it does not fund abortions), and it might even

exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by government." Sullivan,
supra note 21, at 1499-1500. Perhaps the terms "primary" or "pressure" in this formulation are
intended to delimit the analysis in some unspecified way; but if Professor Sullivan means that
strict scrutiny is triggered by pure "effects" on the margin, her test sweeps too widely.

39 See id. at 1498 ("From the perspective of liberty, all conditions on benefits may look alike:
government pressures the speech of the indigent through conditions on welfare no more or less
than it pressures the speech of the rich through conditions on capital gains tax benefits or oil
depletion allowances." (emphasis in original)).
40 See Michelman, The Supreme Court, r968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, Welfare Rights
in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659. But see Bork, The Impossibility of
FindingWelfare Rights in the Constitution, i979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Winter, Poverty, Economic
Equality, and the Equal ProtectionClause, 1972 SUP. CT.REV. 41.

i99x]

SELECTIVE FUNDING

1003

enhance the right to obtain a religious education for the government
to finance public transportation (even if it does not fund religious
schools). We can divide all activities that might be funded by the
government into three categories: (i) those that are substitutes for the
activities to which we have a constitutional right, (2) those that are
complements to the protected activities, and (3) those that are unrelated to the protected activities. Only the funding of substitutes raises
a constitutional problem.
To illustrate the point, assume there is a constitutional right to eat
hamburgers. Assume further that hot dogs are a substitute for hamburgers (a person will eat either a hot dog or a hamburger, but not
both), that round buns are a complement to hamburgers (a person is
more likely to eat a hamburger if he has a round bun than if he does
not), and that radios are unrelated to the demand for hamburgers (a
person is neither more nor less likely to eat a hamburger if he has a
radio). If the government subsidizes none of the items, there is no
pressure on the constitutional right. If the government subsidizes
radios but not hamburgers, the effect is almost the same. If the
government subsidizes round buns but not hamburgers, the effect will
be to increase the consumption of hamburgers. If the government
subsidizes hot dogs but not hamburgers, however, the consumption
of hamburgers will decline. Only in this last case does the selective
41
funding pose a constitutional problem.
The concept of a substitute, however, must be defined narrowly.
Many foods are substitutes for hamburgers. But if the government
subsidizes fish (and nothing else), the effect on hamburger consumption will be minimal. Indeed, hamburger consumption will decline
no more than consumption of frozen lasagna, lima beans, or any other
food. If there are many "substitutes" and only one or a few of them
are subsidized, any effect on the protected right is diluted; it approaches the subsidy of an unrelated activity. Only when there is a
limited set of alternatives, and almost all of them are funded except
for the protected right, will the pressure on the right be sufficient to
pose a constitutional problem.
3. Application to Harris and Lemon. - It is sometimes argued
that abortions must be funded if all other medically necessary procedures are funded. In other words, it violates the Constitution to
"single out" abortion as the only medical procedure not funded under
Medicaid. But this challenge is not valid. Other medical procedures
funded under Medicaid are not substitutes for abortion. They are, if
anything, complementary goods; a woman whose other medical needs

41This analysis follows the economic understanding of taxes and subsidies. According to
standard microeconomic theory, governmental funding of a substitute is equivalent to a tax,
and governmental funding of a complement is equivalent to a subsidy.
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likely to purchase an abortion than if

she had no Medicaid benefits at all. The parallel under Lemon would
be to argue that the government must fund religious classes if it funds
education in all other useful fields of knowledge. But to teach a child
reading, for example, does not substitute for teaching him religion;
indeed, reading education indirectly subsidizes religious education because a person must be literate to read the scriptures.
Far more persuasive is the argument that the Hyde Amendment
is unconstitutional because under it the government pays for the costs
of childbirth but not abortion. Pregnancy is a medical condition that
requires care. There are two ways to deal with pregnancy: abortion
or childbirth. Under the privacy rationale of Roe, the government
has no legitimate interest in which course is taken. Its only interest
is to ensure that, whichever course is taken, the health and safety of
the mother (and child, if she decides to give birth) are protected.
Selective funding creates a clear incentive, at least in terms of shortterm financial considerations, 42 to bring the child to term.
A similar analysis applies to religious education. While the government can pay for secular subjects without having to pay for religious subjects, it cannot pay for secular schools without paying for
religious schools. Secular and religious schools are substitutes, and
the first amendment prohibits the government from influencing the
decision between secularism and religion. Paying for secular schools
without paying for religious schools creates a clear incentive to forgo
religious education.
Like abortion and childbirth, religious and secular schools are
simply different means for accomplishing the same governmental
purpose. The most common explanation for public subsidy of elementary and secondary education is that it contributes to a literate,
numerate, civil, informed, and potentially productive citizenry - an
end that benefits both the students and the rest of society. 43 The

question is whether these objectives can be attained as well in a
religious environment. The best available social science evidence confirms that private religious schools are at least as effective as public
secular schools under these objective standards, 44 and cost much
42 Abortions are generally less expensive than childbirth. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 355 n.9
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the average cost of an abortion in Illinois in 1979 was $150,
while the average cost for childbirth was $135o). And even if the medical costs of childbirth
are paid by the government, the large part of the financial burden of child-rearing lies ahead.
Thus, even under the Hyde Amendment, abortion is the cheaper option in strictly financial
terms.

43 See McConnell & Posner, supra note 3, at 16-17.
44 See J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER & S. KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC,
CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED 122-78 (1982) (summarizing research data). The
average sophomore attending private school scored above the average public school sophomore
in every tested area. See id. at 124. Moreover, private schools are especially beneficial for
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Just as paying the medical expenses for both abortion and

childbirth would equally advance the state interest in the health and
safety of pregnant women, funding both religious and secular schools
would equally advance the state interest in an educated citizenry.
This argument leads to the provisional conclusion that Harrisand
Lemon are both wrong. When the right to choose between two mutually exclusive courses of action is constitutionally vested in the
individual, the government may not fund one of the courses of action
but not the other without a sufficiently important justification for
doing so. The government is not required to fund childbirth, but if
it funds childbirth it must also fund abortion. The government is not
required to fund secular schools, but if it funds secular schools it must
also fund religious schools.
4. The Question of Resource Conservation. - It might be thought
that the conservation of scarce resources is a sufficient reason for
refusing to extend funding to abortions and religious schools. That
was the explanation President Bush recently gave for not actively
supporting tuition tax credits for private schools. 46 But this explanation must be rejected, for two reasons. First, it is not at all clear
that the government saves money by denying funding. To be sure, if
a woman otherwise eligible for Medicaid pays for her own abortion,
the government has saved the price of an abortion. Likewise, if a
family otherwise eligible for a free elementary and secondary education pays for a child's tuition at a private religious school, the government has saved the cost of an education. But if, instead, the
woman succumbs to the pressure of the selective funding scheme and
carries her child to term, the government must pay that cost (a cost
far higher than the cost of an abortion 47), not to mention the probable
increased welfare cost of the baby. And if the financial pressure of
unsubsidized private school tuition, on top of the property taxes earmarked for public education, becomes so large that families send their
children to public schools, then the government must pay that cost
(generally, a cost much higher than private religious school tuition 48 ).
students of minority races and lower income and educational backgrounds; in private schools,
these students tend to score higher than do similar students in the public schools. See id. at
144.
45 See Sonstelie, The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools, 90 J. PoL. ECON. 794, 803 (1982)

(calculating that the cost of a private education is 37% of the cost of a public education of
equivalent quality).
46 See Bush Rejects Tax Break for Private School Cost, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3o, 1989, at A2o,
col. 3.
47 See supra note 42.

But see Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the
Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, i8 ARiz. L. REv. 903, 926-27 (1976)
(arguing that a systematic provision of abortions is more costly because of repetitive abortions
and medical complications).
48 See Sonstelie, supra note 45, at 803.
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Depending on the circumstances, Lemon and the Hyde Amendment
both might increase the burden on the public fisc.
But even if selective funding measures did save money, their constitutionality would still be doubtful. The same amount of money
could be saved (again, assuming money is saved) by reducing payments for both alternatives proportionately. Scarce financial resources
cannot justify either Lemon or the Hyde Amendment.
C. Harris and Lemon Are Both Right
If the Hyde Amendment is constitutional, it must be because the
government has legitimate reasons - reasons not based on hostility
to the abortion right - for funding childbirth and not abortions. 49 If
the refusal to fund religious schools is constitutional, it must be because the government has legitimate (again, non-hostile) reasons to
consider secular public schools more deserving of public subvention
than private religious schools. In this section I argue that the nature
of the rights themselves supply those reasons. I divide the argument
into two parts: (i) legitimate reasons for refusing to fund abortions
and religious schools, which do not apply to childbirth and public
schools; and (2) legitimate reasons for funding childbirth and public
schools, which do not apply to abortions and religious schools.
i. Non-Hostile Reasons for Refusing to Fund Abortion and Religious Schools. - The proponents of abortion funding believe that the
government's reasons for refusing to fund are illegitimate - that is,
the government's refusal is hostile to the abortion right. Indeed, critics
of the decision in Harris have claimed that it is in irreconcilable
conflict with the privacy rationale of Roe. Professor Michael Perry
goes so far as to say that Harrisis "plainly wrong," that its "wrongness
• . . is beyond debate," and that it is "radically inconsistent" with the
"binding constitutional doctrine" of Roe.50 He therefore joins Justice
49 One preliminary definitional point must be made. To claim that the reasons for selective
funding must not arise from "hostility" to the right (whether abortion or religious education) is
not to rely on subjective intent, in the sense that the legislators (or judges acting as decisionmakers) were personally hostile to the right. Claims of interference with substantive liberties,
in contrast to equal treatment claims, have nothing to do with subjective legislative motivation.
The proper question is whether there are reasons for funding childbirth and not abortion, and
for funding secular schools and not religious schools, that could be accepted even by proponents
of the affected rights. Reasons are "hostile" if they depend for their persuasive power upon
antipathy to the exercise of the rights in question. Of course I do not mean that the reasons
must be so powerful that proponents of the affected rights would necessarily agree that they
outweigh other considerations; I mean only that a reason is not "hostile" if a proponent of the
affected right would (or should) agree that the reason "counts" in favor of the decision to fund
selectively.
50 Perry, supra note 24, at 1114.
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Marshall's claim that the Court's approval of the denial of funding
5
for abortions is "the most vicious attack yet devised" on Roe. 1
This view fails to appreciate the full significance of the privacyseparation rationale of Roe. Under that rationale, the government is
required to leave all aspects of the decision about abortion in private
hands. It follows logically that the government is permitted - indeed,
it may even be required5 2 - to refuse to fund abortions. Roe was
not, after all, an affirmation of the proposition that abortion is morally
unobjectionable. It was an affirmation that the question of the morality of abortion is deeply contested and that the government should
not resolve the issue. As Professor Catharine MacKinnon has noted,
"framed as a privacy right a woman's decision to abort would have
no claim on public support and would genuinely not be seen as
53
burdened by that deprivation."
The dissenting opinions in Harrisunintentionally confirm that the
pro-funding position departs from the privacy-separation rationale of
Roe. They are studded with language suggesting that the performance
of an abortion, at least in some circumstances, is a positive good not merely that the protection of a woman's choice is good, but that
the performance of the abortion is good. Justice Marshall, for example, described the Hyde Amendment as having "a devastating impact
on the lives and health of poor women."5 4 This assessment presupposes that abortions promote life and health - a conclusion that is
deeply controversial and that, Roe held, neither the legislatures nor
the courts are entitled to make or act upon. Justice Blackmun commented, among other things, that as a result of the decision in Harris,
"the 'cancer of poverty will continue to grow'; and 'the lot of the
55
poorest among us,' once again, and still, is not to be bettered.
This, too, is a conclusion predicated on the view that abortion is a
good - an appropriate means for combating poverty. Finally, Justice
Stevens supported his claim that "the harm inflicted upon women in
the excluded class is grievous" with a list of "examples of serious
physical harm" that were said to have been caused by the nonperformance of abortion. 5 6 None of their arguments even purports to

51Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 483 (i977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("None can take seriously the Court's assurance
that its 'conclusion signals no retreat from Roe' . . . ." (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475)).
52 See supra pp. 997-98.
53 MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 45, 52-53 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 1984).
54 Harris, 448 U.S. at 348 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 349 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Beal, 432 U.S. at 463 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
56 Id. at 353 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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preserve a posture of neutrality toward the divisive moral question of
abortion.5 7 All three presuppose an answer to that question.
The dissenters' arguments thus present the mirror image of the
majority's claim that the government can make "'a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion."' 5 8 Both sides reach a value judgment about abortion and treat funding as a vehicle for setting national
abortion policy. But that is precisely what Roe states the Constitution
does not allow. This is unfortunate for both sides because one need
not make a "value judgment" about abortion in order to find legitimate, non-hostile reasons for refusing to fund abortions. True adherence to the privacy-separation rationale supplies the answer.
To illustrate this point, let us return to the logic of Lemon. To
say that a decision is "private" is to say that the public has no
legitimate stake in the decision, one way or the other. This affects
both regulation and spending. The federal government is authorized
to tax and spend only to promote the "general Welfare," 9 that is, to
advance public purposes. Even in the absence of an establishment
clause, the federal government would have no authority to tax and
spend for the support of religion - hence the argument, made by
James Madison among others, that the religion clauses were unnecessary in light of the Constitution's careful enumeration of the powers
of the federal government. 60 If a matter is so private that the public
has no right to take a position on it, it falls outside any plausible
definition of the "general Welfare."
When a matter has been constitutionally declared "private" precisely because of intractable public dissension, there is all the more
reason to refrain from public subvention. Taxation is coercion, and
to require taxpayers to support religions they do not accept is understood to violate their religious conscience. In the words of the Virginia
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, passed in 1785, "to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
61
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."
Abortion funding in these respects is no different from the funding
of religion. Having been declared private, the abortion decision canS7 Only Justice Brennan's dissent generally limited itself to the protection of the woman's
right to choose. See id. at 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58 Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).

59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. i.
60 See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (speech by Madison at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention on June 12, 1788); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.

ig6i); see also McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1477-80 (I99O) (discussing the Federalist argument against
a free exercise amendment).
61 Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (785), reprinted in 5 P. KURAND & R. LERNER,
THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 84, 84 (1987).
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not be transformed into a matter of the "general Welfare" for purposes
of taxing and spending. For those who consider abortion to be murder, it is "sinful and tyrannical" to require them to participate in it
with their tax dollars. At the very least, respect for the consciences

of those who believe abortion is murder should count as a legitimate
basis for Congress to decide not to devote coerced tax dollars to that
use. 62 This reason is not "hostile" to the abortion right because a
proponent of abortion rights can and should respect the conscientious

position of fellow citizens who believe they should not be coerced into
supporting something they consider to be murder - just as a proponent of religion can and should respect the right of nonbelievers to be
63
free from coerced support for a church.

This principle is not unique to abortion or religion.

It is well

established that individuals may not be forced to contribute to political
advocacy with which they disagree. 6 4 Similarly, Congress frequently
bars the use of appropriations for activities that significant groups of
taxpayers seriously and conscientiously disapprove of, even though it
65
takes no action to prevent private expenditures on the same activity.

Indeed, this is not unusual even when the defunded activity is protected by the Constitution. Perhaps the most notorious recent example

62 See Epstein, The Supreme Court, z987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HA.Rv. L. REV. 4, 92-94 (2988); Hardy, supra note
47, at 933-38; Sunstein, Is There an UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 337, 343 (x989). Professor Epstein goes so far as to argue that public funding of abortions
would violate the free exercise rights of those who conscientiously oppose abortion. See Epstein,
supra, at 92. This interpretation goes well beyond any free exercise right recognized by the
Court. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (i971) (holding that extension of
federal construction grants to religious colleges did not violate the free exercise rights of objecting
taxpayers).
63 In arguing against Harris, Professor Tribe labeled the "grave moral or religious qualms
that some people might entertain about performing, or even helping to finance, an abortion" as
"irrelevant to the question of government funding of abortions through tax receipts." Tribe,
supra note 27, at 339. This, he says, is because the tax dollars used for abortions are not
"traceable" to persons who object to this use. Id. at 340. In a footnote, he argues in the
alternative that objectors could be permitted to obtain refunds. See id. at 34o n.38. Nowhere
does he explain why these methods of taxpayer disassociation, which have been emphatically
rejected under the establishment clause, are more adequate in the abortion context. Under
Professor Tribe's logic, there could be no conscientious objection to using general tax revenues
to build a church, because this could be done "without necessarily using tax revenues traceable
to objectors." Id. at 340. This view suggests, at a minimum, that Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968), which held that individual federal taxpayers are sufficiently injured by governmental
expenditures in support of religion that they have standing to challenge such expenditures under
the establishment clause, see id. at 103, was wrongly decided. On the "traceability" point, see
McConnell, supra note 3, at 450-52. On the refund point, see id. at 448-5o.
64 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, uxo S. Ct. 2228, 2231 (2990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (,977).
65 See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (addressing lobbying
expenditures).
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is Bob Jones University v. United States. 66 The question in Bob
Jones was whether the Internal Revenue Service could revoke the taxexempt status of a private school that forbade interracial dating and
earlier had excluded all black students. Because these practices were
found to be based on a sincerely held religious tenet, the Court assumed that it would be unconstitutional to "prevent" the school from
enforcing its policies. 67 The Court nevertheless upheld the withdrawal
of the tax exemption on the ground that racial discrimination is "at
odds with the common community conscience" 68 and the public is
' 69
therefore entitled to refuse to be "indirect and vicarious 'donors."'
To be sure, the government necessarily makes many expenditures
despite the conscientious objections of large numbers of taxpayers expenditures on armaments, for example. For the most part, there is
no constitutional remedy for this. 70 It is surely the case, however,
that the objectionable character of an expenditure is a legitimate
argument against it in the political arena. 7 1 A responsible legislator
would attempt to confine the taxing and spending power of the government, as nearly as possible, to matters of genuine public concern
and to avoid needlessly trammeling the consciences of taxpayers. And
the example of arms expenditures highlights the distinction between
these expenditures, on the one hand, and religion and abortion on the
other: armaments are a quintessential public good, while religion and
abortion have been constitutionally declared to be within a zone of
privacy.
Therefore, as in the case of government funding of religion, the
privacy-separation rationale provides ample justification for the government's refusal to fund abortions. When the decisions are private,
they should be left to the institutions of private choice. The public,
66
67
some
basis

461 U.S. 574 (1983)Id. at 604; cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9, 620 (1984) (noting that
truly private organizations have a constitutional right to refuse to admit members on the
of sex or other invidious characteristics).

68Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592.

69 Id. at 591. Bob Jones University's sincere religious doctrine regarding race relations casts
doubt on the Court's holding that the moral repugnance of the school's practices could be a
proper basis for a tax penalty. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.4, 67 (1983); Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEx. L. REv. 259, 263, 269 (1982). When free exercise considerations are not present, however, the government is undoubtedly entitled to withdraw tax
exempt status from racially discriminatory institutions.
70 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (stating that because of the high public
interest in maintaining a sound tax system, religious beliefs in conflict with the government's
use of tax monies afford no basis for resisting the tax).
71 Professor Tribe has pointed out that many liberal members of Congress were embarrassed
in arguing against the Hyde Amendment because they had recently argued that opponents of
the Vietnam War had a legitimate objection to being taxed to pay for governmental activity
they found deeply immoral. See L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 158 (igo).
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which includes conscientious opponents of religion and abortion,
should not be forced to pay for either.
2. Legitimate Reasons for Funding Childbirth and Public Schools.
The preceding discussion argued that the privacy-separation rationale of Roe and Lemon justifies refusing to fund abortions and
religious education. But this is not the full extent of the selectivity of
funding. Not only does the government refuse to fund abortions and
religious education; it also funds their substitutes, childbirth and public schools. An adequate defense of the results of Harris and Lemon
requires legitimate reasons (reasons not stemming from objective hostility to abortion or religion) that support the funding of childbirth
and public schools but not the funding of abortions and religious
schools. It would not be legitimate to fund childbirth if the only
significant effect were to discourage abortions, or public schools if the
only significant effect were to discourage religious education.
An analogy might be drawn to the funding of Republican but not
Democratic political commercials. All of the arguments of the preceding discussion could be made to explain the refusal to fund Democratic commercials: the public is deeply divided; it would be tyrannical and unfair to coerce Republican taxpayers to support a political
cause in which they do not believe; while Democrats should be free
to advertise on their own and should be protected from any interference, they are not entitled to public subvention; neutrality consists in
neither interfering with nor subsidizing the Democrats' commercials.
But these arguments fall flat if the government is funding Republican
commercials. Do proponents of abortion and religion have a similar
right to complain when childbirth and public schools receive public
subsidies?
One obvious difference in the Republican-Democratic selective
funding scheme is that Republican commercials are no less controversial than Democratic. In contrast, although there are deep divisions
over the morality of abortion, few, if any, believe that childbirth is
immoral. Proponents of abortion rights do not have any moral objection to childbirth; they believe that a pregnant woman should be
free to choose whichever alternative seems best to her. 72 Using tax
dollars to pay for childbirth does not force unwilling taxpayers to
support practices they deem morally repugnant.
Moreover, the medical services involved in childbirth serve a function beyond "terminating pregnancy" and improving the mother's
health. They are more than just a substitute for abortion; they are
also a means of caring for a child. While the appropriate way to deal
72 To be sure, one could believe that the population explosion is a grave threat and that
bringing children into the world is morally problematic. But this view is flatly inconsistent with
the privacy rationale of Roe. It is an argument for using governmental powers, including taxing
and spending, to advance collective goals relating to population and reproduction.
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with pregnancy is a controverted issue, everyone agrees that if a child
is to be born, the birth should be completed as safely as possible.
Medical services at birth should be understood as part of a network
of government-funded social services for the benefit of children, which
includes prenatal nutrition and medical care, childbirth itself, nutritional programs for infants, tax deductions for dependents, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, free public education, and many
more. All of these subsidies are paid to women who carry their fetuses
to term; all are denied to those who obtain an abortion. Not even
the most dedicated proponent of abortion funding objects to these
programs. 73
Therefore, the crude version of the argument against the Hyde
Amendment - that equal benefits must be given to those who have
abortions and to those who give birth - is obviously false. There is
a difference between programs designed for the benefit of children
who are going to be born (even though the programs may incidentally
benefit mothers) and programs that are hostile to abortion. If Democrats receive no funding for their ads, they will oppose funding for
Republican ads as well. If abortions receive no funding, proponents
of abortion, if forced to choose, should and probably would prefer
continued funding of childbirth, along with the other forms of assistance to infants, rather than allowing no funding related to pregnancy
at all.
The same argument can be made for the funding of secular but
not religious schools, though here the argument becomes more problematic. Most religious believers do not consider the teaching of
secular subjects in a secular way morally or religiously objectionable.
Religious people may prefer religious education, but they do not consider secular education offensive. A significant minority, however,
disagrees with this assessment, for reasons that should be taken seriously. Secular education, they think, is not actually neutral toward
religion. It undermines religion, both by teaching ethical precepts
contrary to religious faith and by creating the impression that religious
truth is separate, unrelated, and probably inferior to other forms of
truth. This is unacceptable to those who believe that religious truth
pervades all of life. 74 Such people consider secular education antireligious and object to public education funding just as Democrats
object to public funding of Republican commercials. 75 This points to
73 For example, in the course of arguing against the Harris decision, Professor Tribe advocates "providing improved prenatal care, better financial support for women with infants, and
expanded adoption opportunities." Tribe, supra note 27, at 341.
74 See Dent, Religious Children, Seculai Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 865-73 (1988);
Gelfand, Of Monkeys and Men - An Atheist's Heretical View of the Constitutionality of
Teaching the Disproofof a Religion in the Public Schools, i6 J.L. & EDUC. 272, 307-14 (2987);
Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REv. x27 (x985).
75 See, e.g., Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 982, 987 (S.D. Ala.)
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a possible, albeit highly controversial, basis for distinguishing Harris
and Lemon.
Putting aside this difficult problem, public schools can be seen as
more than merely substitutes for religious schools, just as safe and
healthy childbirth is more than just an alternative to abortion. While
both public and parochial schools provide basic education, public
schools arguably provide an additional public good: public schools are
open to all and therefore may be more economically, culturally, racially, and ideologically diverse. Supporters of the public school system often claim that this diversity of population helps both to prepare
students for a diverse and pluralistic life after graduation and to
inculcate the democratic virtues of toleration and understanding.
They might contend, as well, that public schools are better vehicles
for communicating the values and priorities of the community to
succeeding generations. While private schools may be equally adept
at teaching language, math, science, and other curricular subjects,
only the public schools will be able to serve the additional public
76
purpose of instilling public mores and aspirations.
The empirical bases for preferring public to private schools, however, largely rest on inaccurate stereotypes. The actual performance
of public schools in many parts of the country invites skepticism about
their continuing ability to inculcate civic tolerance and teach useful
knowledge. 7 7 In addition, contrary to popular belief, social science
researchers have found private schools to be no more racially and
socially stratified than public schools. 78 Researcher James Coleman
(ruling that the use of public school textbooks advancing the religion of "secular humanism"
violates the establishment clause), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (uIth Cir. 1987). Several recent studies
have concluded that the typical public school curriculum is in fact biased against religion. See

P. VITz,

RELIGION AND TRADITIONAL VALUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY 8o-8i (I985); C. HAYNES, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (I986);
cf. Educators Urge Turn to Studies About Religion, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at AI6, col. 6

(discussing a report by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development calling for
an end to the neglect of religion in public school textbooks).
76 See Fullinwider, The State's Interest in Racially NondiscriminatoryEducation, in PUBLIC
VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 21, 27-30 (N. Devins ed. 1989) (arguing that diversity in the public
school system instills the democratic value of mutual respect and that this diversity should be
required even of private schools); Levin, Educational Vouchers and Social Policy, in CARE AND
EDUCATION OF YOUNG CHILDREN IN AMERICA 103, 116-20 (R. Haskins & J. Gallagher eds.
i98o); Sunstein, supra note 21, at 6o9-1o.

77 See Rebell, Values Inculcation and the Schools: The Need for a New Pierce Compromise,
in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 76, at 37, 41 (arguing that the public schools

increasingly fail to perform their "traditional socialization function" and may no longer be able
to inculcate community values effectively); cf. Arons, Educational Choice as a Civil Rights
Strategy, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 76, at 63, 72 (contending that
public schools disempower minorities and suppress their viewpoints because public school systems are majoritarian institutions).
78 African-Americans make up only five percent of the private school population at grade i2
(as compared to 12.2% in public schools), but the level of integration within individual private
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has concluded that "Catholic schools come closer to the American
ideal of the 'common school,' educating all alike, than do the public
schools." 79 Moreover, the argument for assimilation and intra-school
diversity can slip all too easily into intolerance toward religious minorities who prefer to maintain an identity distinct from the majoritarian culture.8 0 A disguised bigotry may lurk in the assumption that
sectarianism breeds intolerance; a secular upbringing can breed its
own form of intolerance.
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence supporting the supposed
superiority of public schools and the illegitimacy of a policy of enforced
religious assimilation, preferential funding for public education is constitutionally defensible, even if not overwhelmingly so. The claims in
favor of public schools are plausible even if mistaken, and absent
more direct evidence that the decisionmaking process is corrupted by
hostility toward religion (or toward those religions most likely to maintain private school systems),8 1 such judgments are within the legislative discretion. Just as funding only childbirth can be defended without disparaging the abortion right, funding only public schools can be
defended without denigrating the value of religion or religious education. Therefore, both Harris and Lemon seem correctly decided.
D. Harris Is Right; Lemon Is Wrong
In section B, I argued that a selective funding scheme raises
constitutional problems if it provides assistance only to one of two
mutually exclusive activities, when the choice between the alternatives
is constitutionally vested in the individual. According to this argument, both Harris and Lemon were wrongly decided. In section C,
however, I argued that the privacy-separation rationale of Roe and
Pierce provides a constitutionally sufficient justification for funding
schools is significantly higher, so that the two tendencies approximately cancel each other out.
See J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER & S. KILGORE, supra note 44, at 29-37. Similarly, though the
median income of private school students' families ($23,200) is higher than that of public school
families ($18,700), see id. at 38, "the degree of economic segregation is lower in the private
sector as a whole, and in the Catholic and other private sectors separately, than in the public
sector." Id. at 41. Perhaps most significantly, the educational achievement levels of black and
white students are far closer in Catholic than in public schools. See id. at 143-46.
79Id. at i44.
80 When the state of Oregon sought to defend its law outlawing parochial schooling struck
down in Pierce, it made the following argument to the Supreme Court:
The voters in Oregon might also have based their action in adopting this law upon the
alarm which they felt at the rising tide of religious suspicions in this country, and upon
their belief that the basic cause of such religious feelings was the separation of children
along religious lines during the most susceptible years of their lives, with the inevitable
awakening of a consciousness of separation, and a distrust and suspicion of those from
whom they were so carefully guarded.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 525 (1925) (argument for Governor Pierce).
81 See infra p. io44.
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childbirth but not abortion, and secular public schools but not private
religious schools. The argument in section C, if accepted, counters
the argument in section B. But the argument in section C provides
no justification for an actual penalty on the practice of a constitutional
right. In other words, section C provides a justification for funding
substitutes, but not for imposing a penalty for obtaining an abortion
or a religious education. In this section, I argue that Lemon imposes
a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right, but that Harris
does not - and thus that the privacy-separation rationale provides a
justification for the Hyde Amendment but not for Lemon.
x. The Basic Analysis. - A common understanding of constitutional law is that although the government has no obligation (absent
exceptional circumstances) to subsidize the exercise of constitutional
rights, it is forbidden to penalize the exercise of those rights. Another
way to put the point is that the government may not (without strong,
perhaps compelling, justification) structure its funding in such a way
that an individual is made worse off than he would have been had he
not exercised his constitutional right, except that he may be required
to bear the costs of exercising the right itself. For example, a state
may impose a toll on interstate travel, but only to recoup the costs
imposed on the state by that travel. Although the state is not required
to subsidize interstate travel out of its general revenues, it is not
permitted to single out interstate travel for special exactions beyond
the costs that such travel generates.
It is now widely agreed that in determining whether a person is
"better off" or "worse off" it is necessary to consider the effect on
government benefits, as well as on common law entitlements. For
example, the government may not exclude a discharged worker who
is a Seventh Day Adventist from unemployment compensation on the
ground that she will not work on a Saturday. 2 Not working on a
Saturday has its costs, but the government may not add to those costs
either by denying an otherwise available benefit or by imposing a
fine or other deprivation. Both are "penalties" on the exercise of the
right.
The most extensive body of doctrine bearing on this point has
arisen under the free speech clause. The government is not required
to subsidize speech. So long as it treats all forms of speech in a
content-neutral, nondiscriminatory fashion, it can require speakers to
bear the full noncommunicative costs of their expression. Thus, in
Cox v. New Hampshire,8 3 the Court permitted the state to charge a
license fee for engaging in a street demonstration, notwithstanding the
fact that holding such a demonstration was protected under the free

82

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

83 312

U.S.

569

(194).
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speech clause. The Court insisted, however, that the fee was "'not a
revenue tax"'; it was set only at a level necessary to meet expenses
"'incident to"' the demonstration. 84 The logic was that citizens may
be required to bear the costs of exercising constitutional rights, but
that greater exactions are impermissible because they penalize the
exercise of the rights.
Similarly, in Cammarano v. United States,8 5 the Court upheld a
tax regulation forbidding the deduction of lobbying costs. The effect
of this was to require businesses to bear the full cost of exercising
their constitutional right to political advocacy, although virtually all
other costs of doing business were partially defrayed by the public
86
through tax deductions. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
the Court upheld the withdrawal of tax-exempt status from nonprofit
organizations that engage in substantial political lobbying. Because
nonprofit organizations are permitted to conduct their lobbying activities through an affiliated organization that is tax exempt but that
cannot receive tax-deductible contributions, Taxation with Representation forced these organizations to bear the full cost of exercising
their constitutional right to lobby by requiring them to set up separate
organizations, but did not require them to forfeit tax exemptions on
their other activities. The effect is that they paid the cost of their
lobbying, but otherwise were neither better off nor worse off.
The Court has been equally insistent that absent compelling justification the government may not withhold benefits from those who
engage in constitutionally protected speech, beyond the cost of such
advocacy to the public. In FCC v. League of Women Voters,8 7 the
Court struck down a statute forbidding publicly subsidized broadcasters from editorializing. The effect of this statute was not merely
to avoid government funding of editorials, but to cut off the subsidies
to all of a broadcaster's programming if it editorialized, even with its
own funds. As the Court noted, because a "station has no way of
limiting the use of its federal funds to all noneditorializing activities,
• . . it is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its
editorial activity."8 8 And in Perry v. Sindermann,8 9 the Court held
that it would be unconstitutional to fire a teacher for his public
political positions. The difference between cases such as Cox, Cammarano, and Taxation with Representation and cases such as League
of Women Voters and Perry is that the speakers in the first category
were merely forced to bear the costs associated with their speech,
84 Id. at 577 (quoting State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 144, 16 A.2d 5o8, 513 (1940)).
8' 358 U.S. 498 (i958).
86 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
87468 U.S. 364 (1984).

8 Id. at 400.
89 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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while the speakers in the second category lost much more: their entire
federal subsidy (in League of Women Voters) and their jobs (in Perry).90
2. Application to Harris and Lemon. - Under this analysis, Harris
and Lemon are distinguishable. The Hyde Amendment provides that
a woman desiring an abortion must pay the cost of the abortion
herself, but she continues to be eligible for all other medical services
funded under Medicaid. Indeed, the Harris Court commented that
"[a] substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had
attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible
candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion." 9 '
By contrast, under Lemon, if a family chooses to integrate a religious
element into primary or secondary schooling, not only must they bear
the costs of the religious education, but they also forfeit all public
subsidy for education, including secular subjects. It is as if those who
get an abortion were thereby excluded from Medicaid. Lemon, then,
is structurally parallel to League of Women Voters and Perry. It
extracts a penalty -

and a large one -

for the exercise of constitu-

tional rights. The Hyde Amendment, on the other hand, is more like
Cox, Cammarano, and Taxation with Representation. It is a mere
refusal to subsidize.
A simple way to distinguish between penalties and mere refusals
to subsidize is to compare the financial impact on those who exercise
a constitutional right with the impact on similarly situated persons
who do not. If the only difference between the two is that the former
are "poorer" to the extent of the cost of exercising the constitutional
right, the case is one of a mere failure to subsidize. If the difference
is greater than the cost of exercising the constitutional right, the case
is one of penalty.
If it were possible to accomplish religious objectives through an
entirely separate religious component to education (after-school programs, for example, or Sunday School), then Lemon would more
closely resemble Taxation with Representation. But many of those
who choose religious schools believe that secular knowledge cannot
be rigidly separated from the religious without gravely distorting the
child's education. 9 2 To separate the secular from the religious is to
suggest that religion is irrelevant to the things of this world. Many

90Professor Lynn Baker has applied a similar analysis to public assistance cases under a
variety of constitutional provisions. See Baker, supra note 21, at 1213-46. The analysis also
resembles Professor Ken Simons' distinction between "offers" and "threats." See Simons, Offers,
Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 289, 291-92 (1989).
91 Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
92 See, e.g., A. GREELEY & P. Rossi, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC AMERICANS I90-98

(r966) (observing that religious instruction outside the regular classroom is less likely to inculcate
religious values than full-time religious schooling).
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believe that education should reflect the truth that God is the creator
of all and is sovereign over all. Moreover, much of the ostensibly
neutral curriculum in public schools may undermine religious teaching. 93 Sex education, Darwinian evolution, and values clarification
are ready examples, but the secular orientation of public schools pervades the entire curriculum. From this perspective, it is not sufficient
to introduce religious education on the side.
Lemon's holding that any school with a religious component to its
program must be denied funding therefore extracts a penalty for exercising a constitutional right. A numerical hypothetical may help to
make the point. Suppose that the secular components of parochial
school education cost the same as a public school education - say
$4000 per pupil per year. Suppose further that introduction of a
religious element requires an additional expenditure of $5oo per pupil.
Under Lemon, the government cannot fund the $5oo incremental cost
of the religious component. But that is largely uncontroversial. To
my knowledge, no one disputes that it is just and proper for the
government to refuse to pay the incremental cost of religious components of the education, in light of the conscientious objection many
taxpayers have toward mandatory support for religious instruction.
What is controversial is that the government refuses to pay for the
secular components as well - components toward which no one can
have a conscientious objection. In Lemon, for example, the state was
forbidden to pay even a portion of the cost of certain strictly nonreligious subjects - "mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical
science, and physical education." 94 By exercising their constitutional
right to introduce a religious element into their child's education at
their own expense, a family forfeits their entitlement to the largest
and most important benefit provided by the state for its people. By
choosing a religious education, the family loses their right to $4000 of
secular services.
This argument cannot be made against the Hyde Amendment. A
woman who obtains an abortion at her own expense is asked to forfeit
nothing. If Medicaid benefits are worth, on average, $4000 per year,
and if an abortion costs $5oo, the effect of the Hyde Amendment is
to require the woman to pay only the $500 - the incremental cost of
the abortion. She remains eligible for the $4000 in non-abortion benefits, the same benefits received by every other Medicaid beneficiary.
Thus, although the government has refused to pay for the exercise of
the constitutional right to an abortion, it has not penalized the exercise
of that right by making other benefits conditional on its waiver.
The conclusion is the same when we compare the benefits available
to persons who exercise their rights to abortion and religious education
93 See supra p. 1o2.
94 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 6io.
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with the benefits that would be available if there were no Medicaid
or public school programs. A family with children in religious schools
would be substantially better off if the government neither provided
schools nor imposed property taxes to pay for them. To illustrate this
point, let us consider the justification for public school funding offered
by some economists: public support is necessary because young children are unable to borrow to pay for early education and repay the
loan from their earnings after graduation. 95 Under this theory, each
person is given one free education and each person is required to pay
one lifetime's worth of education taxes in return. For the typical
person, there is no "subsidy" for education at all: it is like a loan.
Each person pays for his own education and no one else's. But for
the child who attends a religious school, the financing system is perverse - the child is taxed later in life for a benefit he never received.
Had the government stayed out of the picture altogether, families
could use money now going for property taxes to pay for tuition to
schools of their choice. As it is, religious schoolchildren are required
to pay twice.
By contrast, because Medicaid involves redistribution for the benefit of the poor, the Medicaid recipient who obtains an abortion is
better off under the Hyde Amendment than she would be without
Medicaid at all. Even if Medicaid were a straight social insurance
program, she would not be penalized by the Hyde Amendment. Without Medicaid, she would save money in taxes. Depending on whether
Medicaid is an efficient program, she might be better or worse off
without the program. But her circumstances would not be different
from those of any other citizen. Her exercise of a constitutional right
has no net effect on the comparison. The Hyde Amendment thus
imposes no burden on the right to an abortion, whereas Lemon imposes a substantial burden on the constitutional right to incorporate
religious teaching into one's primary or secondary education.
3. The Intermingling of Religious and Secular Education. - It
might be argued, however, that the privacy-separation rationale applies whenever religious teaching is so intermingled with secular subjects that even the secular subjects have the effect of promoting
religion. This is not a mere hypothetical danger, for one of the key
purposes of religious primary and secondary schools is integrating
religion into the regular curriculum. 96 This integration has been

95See McConnell & Posner, supra note 3, at 17, IS; West, An Economic Analysis of the
Law and Politics of Non-Public School "Aid," i9 J.L. & ECON. 79, 87-89 (1976).
96 See H. BUETOW, THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL 102-12 (1988). Some of the religious schools
in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), for example, took the position
that "'it is not sufficient that the teachings of Christianity be a separate subject in the curriculum,
but the Word of God must be an all-pervading force in the educational program.'" Id. at 379
(emphasis omitted) (quoting a handbook from one of the schools). This is not to say that in
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thought to pose an additional problem under the establishment
clause. 9 7 When a school is so "pervasively sectarian"9 8 that its religious and secular components are "inextricably intertwined," 99 the
Court has concluded that any aid -

even of a secular nature

-

will

inevitably have the effect of promoting religion.
To modify the example in the previous discussion, suppose that
secular education costs $40oo and that the desired religious components would cost $50o if purchased and provided separately. Some
items in the school curriculum, however, can accomplish both secular
and religious goals. In literature, the class can read The Pilgrim's
Progress and the poems of George Herbert instead of Studs Lonigan
and Emily Dickinson. In math, some of the problem sets can involve
religious examples. An administrator can also conduct chapel, and so
on. Note that approaches of this sort can contribute to the religious
education without detracting from the educational values of the school
at all. Assume that by using these approaches, the religious school
can reduce the cost of the religious component from $5o0 to $3oo, at
no additional cost to the secular component. As above, the families
will pay the incremental cost of the religious education, or $30o. The
question is whether the government can pay the rest. Is religion
subsidized when a $4000 contribution to a religious school produces
$4000 in secular value plus $200 in religious value?
To determine whether there is a subsidy, we can look at the
example from the point of view of either the taxpayers or the affected
families. Taxpayers could be injured by the families' decision to
incorporate religious elements into their children's secular education if
this decision either increased the cost to the taxpayers or decreased
the value received by the public from the education. But the families'
decision to adopt a religious curriculum does not have either effect:
parochial schools, provided they meet the same objective standards
of educational quality met by the public schools, produce the same
value to the public, and they cost no more. The taxpayers, as taxpayers, should therefore be indifferent. They are getting full "secular
value" for their money, to borrow Dean Jesse Choper's expression.lob
It is impossible to claim that they are being taxed to support a religion
they do not share; they are taxed only to support education, without
regard to whether religion is also supported.
most religiously affiliated schools, in actual practice, the religious elements are fully integrated
into the curriculum.
97 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 439-40.
98 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (I973); accord Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 755-59 (1976).
99 LeMon, 403 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring); accord GrandRapids, 473 U.S. at 384;
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975).
100 See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools - An Update, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 5, 14 (1987).
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From the families' point of view, the question is whether the
freedom to use the child's share of public education spending in a
religious school creates either an incentive or a disincentive to exercise
religion. If the subsidy is no greater than that given to students in
secular schools, it obviously creates no such incentive. Those who
choose religious education are neither better off nor worse off than
those who prefer secular education. Indeed, everyone is better off, in
the sense that they have more choices and thus can obtain an education more closely tailored to their preferences.
The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this argument
in the context of so-called "indirect" aid (aid provided to the student
or family instead of the school). In Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind,10 1 for example, the Court unanimously held
that it does not violate the establishment clause for a state to provide
assistance for a student's seminary education at a sectarian school
under a program to support vocational education for the blind. The
"secular value" to the state is that the blind student is equipped for
gainful employment, no less than if he had trained to become a
computer technician or a physical therapist. Because the state received full secular value, it was constitutionally irrelevant that religious values were concomitantly served. Similarly, the Court has
indicated that programs akin to the "G.I. Bill," in which the government pays the cost of tuition without regard to whether the institution
is religious or nonreligious, are permissible. 10 2 These programs are
not "subsidies" to religion because they do not treat those who choose
religious education more favorably than others. They are subsidies to
education, not to religion. There is no persuasive reason why the
same principle should not be extended to primary and secondary
schools. '

0 3

Accordingly, the denial of funding to religious schools cannot be
justified by the intermingling of religious and secular components of
the curriculum, which is a matter of indifference to the taxpayers and
does not affect the incentives of the families involved. Lemon, unlike
the Hyde Amendment, thus unjustifiably imposes a significant penalty
for the exercise of a constitutional right, beyond merely requiring the
'0' 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
102 See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.38 (1973); Americans
United for Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97, 1o2-o5 (M.D. Tenn.),
aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Smith v. Board of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 429 F.
Supp. 871, 877-79 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
103 The great practical advantage of "indirect" aid is that the funding mechanism guarantees
that individual choice, and not governmental favoritism, will dictate the allocation of funds.
The potential for such governmental favoritism might be sufficient justification for excluding
religious organizations from discretionary grant programs. But if funds for parochial schools
are allocated on a per-pupil basis, there is no more danger of allocative distortion than with an
"indirect" funding scheme.
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individual to bear the cost of exercising the right. Rather than being
required by the first amendment, the result in Lemon is more likely
forbidden by it.
II. STRICTER SEPARATION: RESTRICTIONS ON COUNSELING,
COMMINGLING PROGRAMS, AND USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

Harris and Lemon both involved the problem of direct cash subsidies, which are the simplest, most direct form of public aid. Supreme Court precedent in this context is reasonably uncomplicated:
under Lemon and its progeny, direct cash subsidies to parochial
schools almost invariably are struck down.' 0 4 At the other extreme,
consensus also exists. Even the staunchest opponents of aid to religion
concede that denying churches
and religious schools access to such
"matters of common right"'0 5 as police or fire protection or access to
public highways would be unconstitutional.' 06 And no one believes
that the principle of Harris would allow the government to deprive
abortion clinics of these forms of public "aid."
The reason these concessions are so uncontroversial is rarely explained; but it is revealing. Services such as police, fire, and roads
are monopolies of the government as well as public goods (that is,
goods that provide widespread benefits even to persons who do not
pay for them). The significance of being government monopolies is
that if the government does not provide the services to particular
entities (churches or abortion clinics), those entities will not be able
to obtain them from alternate sources. Because the services are indispensable, a denial of access ("aid") would therefore be tantamount
to destruction. The significance of being public goods is that there is
no (or very little) marginal cost to serving an additional consumer.
Taxpayers would save nothing (or very little) if churches or abortion
clinics were excluded. Exclusion, therefore, would have devastating
effects on the private entities excluded while producing almost no
benefit to the public. Cash grants are at the opposite extreme: there
are multiple sources of cash, and the entire grant is a marginal cost
to the taxpayers.
Supreme Court precedent involving forms of aid between these
extremes is complicated, contested, and in flux. While this is not the
occasion to provide a comprehensive critique, it would be useful to
discuss those forms of aid that affect both abortion and religious
104 The sole exception in the Supreme Court is Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (I98O), which upheld a statute reimbursing parochial schools
for the cost of administering state-prepared standardized tests. See id. at 66o-6r.
105 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 6o (1947) (Rutledge, J.,dissenting).
106 See id.; see also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (rejecting

the position that the state cannot provide basic services to religious institutions).
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education. There are three main areas of comparison: (i) restrictions
on the speech of government employees and grantees, (2) structural
restrictions on government grantees, and (3)restrictions on the use of
public facilities. This Part will analyze these attempts to effectuate a
stricter "separation" - between government and religion, and between
government and abortion - by extending the general theory of Part I.
A. Restrictions on Speech
In Lemon, the Court held that the "State must be certain... that
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.' 0 7 A similar prohibition
exists in the public schools, where teachers are strictly forbidden to
use their tax-supported position to encourage religion.' 0 8 The same
logic underlies many abortion-related funding statutes. For example,
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,10 9 portions of the Missouri law not reviewed on the merits forbade "encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life"
with public funds" 0 or by public employees within the scope of their
employment."' Such restrictions have produced free speech challenges in the context of both abortion and religion. Publicly financed
family planning counselors have contended they have the first amendment right to provide abortion counseling," 2 and public school teachers have asserted a constitutional right to express religious convictions
3
to their students."1
107 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 61g.
108 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985); Webster v. New Lenox School
Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d oo4, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 199o); Steele v. Van Buren Pub. School Dist.,
845 F.2d 1492, 1495-96 (8th Cir. x988); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1518-19 0(.
Colo. 1989), aff'd, No. 89-1014 (ioth Cir. Dec. 17, 199o) (iggo U.S. App. LEXIS 21,683); Breen
v. Runkel, 614 F. Supp. 355, 357-60 (D. Mich. 1985).
109 o9 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (plurality opinion).
110 Mo. REv. STAT. § x88.205 (1986).

M See id. § x88.210; Webster, iog S. Ct. at 3053. The law also forbade any such encouragement or counseling in public facilities, see Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.215 (1986), a restriction
considered below, see infra pp. 1032-33. The Eighth Circuit in Webster struck down all three
provisions, but the state appealed only the provision pertaining to counseling with public funds.
See iog S. Ct. at 3053. Accepting the state's claim that this provision is directed only to
disbursing officers, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no actual case or controversy
pertaining to this portion of the statute. See id. at 3053-54.
112 See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 72-75 (ist Cir.
x99o), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3037 (U.S. June 8, ig9o) (No. 89-1929); see also
Note, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule, 41 STAN. L. REv. 401, 408-22 (i989) (arguing
that title X imposes an unconstitutional condition on family planning counselors' free speech).
11- See, e.g., Smith v. Blue Valley Unified School Dist., 9 Religious Freedom Rptr. (Campbell
Univ.) i2o (D. Kan. Apr. 24, x989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4067) (granting summary judgment

against an assistant principal who raised a free speech challenge to his dismissal for discussing
religious subjects with students); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1518-19 (D.Colo.
1989), aff'd, No. 89-104 (ioth Cir. Dec. 17, i99o) (i99o U.S. App. LEXIS 21,683) (denying a

teacher's asserted right to read the Bible during silent reading periods). See generally J. WHITE-
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The theory behind the restrictions is that the government and its
agents must abstain from the debate concerning matters that the
Constitution deems private. Assuming the restrictions are evenhandedly set and applied and that they are confined to the teacher, doctor,
or counselor's formal activities on behalf of the government, the restrictions seem not only legitimate but unavoidable. When government itself is barred from influencing private choice, it cannot empower agents with special positions to influence students or clients in
making that private choice. A teacher, doctor, or counselor who feels
compelled to spread (or oppose) the gospel or to advocate (or oppose)
abortion should find a position in the private sector.1 1 4 In the public
sector, their speech must be constrained because
they are agents and
5
perceived mouthpieces of the government."
This argument presupposes that the teachers and family planning
counselors involved are properly treated as agents of the government
rather than as independent speakers. While this is probably an unavoidable conclusion in the case of government employees, it is possible that teachers or counselors in publicly funded but privately
administered programs should be treated differently. To be sure, in
the case of religion, the Supreme Court has not drawn any such
distinction. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 116 for example, the Court analyzed7
the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA),1
which authorizes federal grants to public and private organizations,
HEAD, THE FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 34-42 (1983)
(discussing the first amendment rights of teachers).
114 The First Circuit's contrary argument in Massachusetts overlooks the difference between
privately funded and publicly funded activity: "[I]f information restrictions are invalid in general
[that is, as applied to private physicians], how can they be valid in the limited situations of
public funds? It is axiomatic that the government cannot do indirectly (i.e. through funding
decisions) what it cannot do directly." Massachusetts, 899 F.2d at 72. Similar logic would
suggest that if the government does not have the right to dictate the curriculum of private
schools, it does not have the right to dictate the curriculum of public schools. This "reasoning"
is an example of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine run riot. If the public-private distinction has any validity (and the privacy-separation rationale rests on just such a distinction), the
government's authority to regulate private speech is an entirely different matter from its authority
to regulate its own speech through its agents.
'Is Some have argued that the nature of the physician-patient relationship sets the title X
restrictions apart, but as a constitutional matter there is no difference between the relationship
of a government-funded physician to his patients with respect to abortion counseling and the
relationship of a public school teacher to his students with respect to religious communications.
Both are professionals. Both have a certain degree of professional autonomy, whether called
"medical judgment" or "academic freedom." Both are limited in that autonomy if they work
for the government, insofar as the government's authority with respect to "private" matters is
limited.
116 487 U.S. 589 (1988). The author of this Article argued the case in the Supreme Court
on behalf of the private intervenors.
117 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-1o (1988).
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both secular and religiously affiliated, to provide various services to
combat teenage pregnancy, including counseling to promote sexual
self-discipline. The plaintiffs alleged that the program constitutes
government-funded religious indoctrination. While upholding the program on its face, the Court held that the federal government must
ensure that no AFLA grantees "use materials that have an explicitly
religious content or are designed to inculcate the views of a particular
religious faith."" 8 This implicitly affirmed that recipients of federal
grants are subject to restrictions applicable to the government itself.
The same logic would support imposition of similar restrictions
governing title X grantees with respect to the counseling of abortion.
If grantees are governmental actors for purposes of the establishment
clause, they are governmental actors for purposes of abortion restrictions. If employees of grantees are private speakers for purposes of
speech about abortion, they are private speakers for purposes of
speech about religion as well. 1 19 To reach a different result in the
title X cases would require the Court to revisit Kendrick.

B. Structural Restrictions on Grantees
Even if we conclude that the Hyde Amendment itself does not
impose a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right, the analysis
in Part I leads to the conclusion that some abortion funding restrictions
are unconstitutional. Consider three possible restrictions on the activities of government-funded family planning clinics: (i) the grantee may
not use public funds to perform abortions; (2) the grantee may not
perform abortions within the same physical facility used for publicly
funded family planning services; and (3) organizations that perform
abortions anywhere may not receive grants. Restriction (i) was imposed in the pre-1988 federal title X regulations. 120 Restriction (2)
was imposed by the 1988 federal title X regulations. 121 Restriction
122
(3)has been imposed by some states.
Parallel restrictions arise when religious or religiously affiliated
organizations seek grants for the provision of secular public services,
such as day care. Under recently enacted federal legislation, poor
families will receive financial assistance for obtaining child care while

118 Kendrick, 487

U.S. at 621.

119 The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project has conducted the litigation in both Kendrick

and the title X cases, taking inconsistent positions on free speech rights of grantees depending
on whether the speech is in favor of abortion or religion.
120 See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5) (1987) (providing that grant recipients may not "provide
abortions as a method of family planning").
121 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (i989).
122 See, e.g., i98o Ariz. Sess. Laws 842, 86o.
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the parents work outside the home. 1 23 As with abortion, there are
three logical possibilities regarding religious participation in publicly
funded day care: (i) the grantee may not use federal funds for religious
worship or instruction (though remaining free to engage in religious
activities out of private funds); (2) the grantee may not engage in
religious activities within the same physical facility used for publicly
funded day care; and (3)the grantee may not be a religious organization. Even if Harris and Lemon are both right, it should follow
that, in both contexts, restriction (I) is constitutional, restriction (3)is
unconstitutional, and restriction (2) is a close case, whose outcome
depends on the particular facts. 124
Restriction (i) seems to raise no constitutional question apart from
that raised by Harris or Lemon. If the government is not required to
fund abortions directly through Medicaid, it is not required to fund
abortions indirectly, through aid to abortion providers. Similarly,
because the government is not required (indeed, it is forbidden) to
123 See Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of i9go, enacted in Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 199o, §§ 5081-5082, Pub. L. No. ioi-5o8, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 625 (104 Stat. 1388). It has been reported that about one-fourth to one-third of
day care centers are now church-affiliated. See Congressional Research Serv., Constitutionality
of Possible Amendment to S. 5 Removing Certificates From § ig(a), at 7 (May 9, 1989) (on file
at the Harvard Law School Library).
124 Interestingly, even statutory construction is distorted by the strong differences in perception regarding abortion and religion. Section zoo8 of title X of the Public Health Service Act
provides that "none of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning." 42 U.S.C. § 3ooa-6 (1988). This language, on
its face, incorporates restriction (2): publicly funded family planning services may not be offered
in the same program in which abortions are performed. Notwithstanding this language, the
First Circuit held that such an interpretation "violates congressional intent because of the effect
it would have of limiting family planning programs." Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 6o (ist Cir. 19go), petitionfor cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3037 (U.S.
June 8, 199o) (No. 89-1929).

By contrast, § 658M(a) of the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act provides that
"[n]o financial assistance provided under this subchapter shall be expended for any sectarian
purpose or activity, including sectarian worship and instruction" in child care centers receiving
funds directly from government agencies. This appears to incorporate restriction (i): public
funds may not be used for religious worship or instruction. (The restriction does not apply to
the use of certificates or vouchers given to parents.)
Ironically, the Committee Report accompanying the Act, under the chairmanship of Senator
Edward Kennedy, rejected this reading of the restriction as too "narrow" and "technical" and
instead found that "an entity receiving any form of financial assistance under this Act shall not
include any sectarian activities, worship or instruction in providing child care services under
this Act." S.REP. No. 17, ioist Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1989). Thus, the Committee interpreted
the language of the Act as if it incorporated restriction (2) - no day care centers receiving
federal funds may engage in religious activities while providing day care services.
Thus, the two statutory provisions have been interpreted in a manner precisely opposite
from what their language commands: the narrowly drawn religion restriction is interpreted in a
"broad" fashion, while the broader abortion restriction is interpreted in a "narrow" and "technical" fashion. One is forced to conclude that in applying principles of statutory construction,
as in interpreting constitutional doctrine, legal consistency has been subordinated to ideology.
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fund religion directly, it can ensure that it is not funding religion
indirectly by forbidding grantees from using federal day care money
25
to pay for religious activities.
In contrast, restriction (3)in both contexts goes beyond a mere
refusal to fund. An Arizona appropriations bill contained a provision
that denied state funding to any nongovernmental "agencies or entities
which offer abortions, abortion procedures, counseling for abortion
procedures or abortion referrals."'1 2 6 An entity that performed abortions, even in separate facilities with its own money, thus could receive
no family planning funding in that state. The effect of the statute
was to impose a $47,000 penalty on Planned Parenthood for its privately funded abortion-related activities, a penalty equal to the
amount it would otherwise have received from the state. Reasoning
that "the State of Arizona may not unreasonably interfere with the
right of Planned Parenthood to engage in abortion or abortion-related
speech activities, but the State need not support, monetarily or otherwise, those activities,' 1 27 the Ninth Circuit rejected the state's argument that the provision was necessary in order to prevent the
"free[ing] up [of other] funds used to support abortion-related activities.' 2 8 However, the court remanded the case to the district court
for a determination whether withdrawing all state funds from Planned
Parenthood was the only way to ensure that state funds would not be
used to support abortion-related activities. 129 This analysis seems
correct. In the context of an organization maintaining separate facilities with distinct accounting records, the state would have no justification for denying aid to one facility simply because another facility
performs abortion services; the state could easily track its funds and
determine that the grants assist only the "non-abortion" service facility.
With respect to the religion analogue, the suggestion that religious
organizations must categorically be barred from participation in all
government-funded programs must be rejected. Although favored by
the so-called "strict separationists," this has never been the rule in
establishment clause cases and has been rejected by the Supreme
Court in every case in which it has been seriously advanced.13 0 The
privacy-separation rationale requires the government to treat the performance of abortions and the exercise of religion by others as matters
125 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-14 (1988); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 759-61 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-80 (197i).

126 ig8o Ariz. Sess. Laws 842, 86o.
127 Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 941 (gth Cir. 1983).
128 Id. at 945.
129 See id. at 946.
130 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608-09 (x988); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 742-43 (1973); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. i, i6-18 (i947); Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1899).
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of indifference. In both of these contexts, denying federal money for
activities that would otherwise be funded would amount to a substantial penalty for exercising one's constitutional rights.
Restriction (2) presents a much closer case. The most prominent
example in the abortion context is the 1988 title X regulations, which
prohibit grantees from carrying out government-funded family plan13 1
ning services in a facility also used for abortion-related services.
Although prior regulations required only that grantees maintain financial records showing that federal funds were used in accordance with
project requirements (which proscribed funding for abortion activity), 1 3 2 the new regulations specify that a titie X project must be
"physically and financially separate" from any prohibited abortionrelated services. 133 The lower federal courts are divided on the constitutionality of these regulations, 13 4 and the issue is awaiting resolution by the Supreme Court.
If the establishment clause precedents were followed, there is little
doubt that the restrictions would be upheld. In GrandRapids School
District zv.
Ball,135 full-time public school teachers went on an itinerant basis to various schools, public and private, to provide special
secular remedial and enrichment courses to supplement the ordinary
curriculum. The Court held this "Shared Time" program unconstitutional as it applied to instruction in religious schools. 136 While the
Court did not question that parochial school students were eligible to
receive the special instruction, it held that they could do so only in
37
locations physically separate from the religiouis school.'1
The Court offered three reasons for this holding. First, it stated
that public school teachers temporarily in the "atmosphere" of a religious school "may well subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to
the environment in which they teach, while students will perceive the
instruction provided in the context of the dominantly religious message
of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect.' 138 Second, it stated that the symbolic effect of a physical separation is

131

See

42

C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989).

132 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.5, 59.2
133 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (i99o).

o

8,

1

59.2 2

(1987).

134Compare Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 72-75 (Ist
Cir. 199o) (holding the regulations unconstitutional), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3037
(U.S. June 8, i9go) (No. 89-x929) and Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465,
1477-78 (D. Colo. 1988) (same) with New York v. Bowen, 69o F. Supp. 1261, 1272-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the regulations).
13'473 U.S. 373 (1985). The author of this Article prepared a brief and presented oral
argument in Grand Rapids on the losing side.
136 See id. at 397.
137 See id. at 388-89, 391, 396 (limiting the rationale of the Court to activities on the
premises of religious schools).
138 Id. at 3 88.
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important, because allowing the provision of government-funded remedial education on the premises of the parochial school is "a powerful
symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of the religious beliefs
taught in the same class at some other time during the day. '139 Third,
the Court feared that governmental financial support of one activity
within an integrated facility inevitably subsidizes all the other activities within the facility. 140 Only by requiring physical separation could
the government ensure that its support for one activity (secular education) would not indirectly subsidize the other (religion). 14 1 Thus,
the effect of Grand Rapids was to impose restriction (2).
The explanation offered by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) for the new title X abortion regulations is substantially
identical to the Court's reasoning in Grand Rapids. HHS reasoned
first that the new restrictions are needed to prevent governmentfunded counseling that would "encourage, promote or advocate abortion."1 42 Those who receive government-funded family planning services must be screened from the indoctrinating effect of pro-abortion
activity. Indoctrination may be hard to avoid in a facility whose
commitment to the "appropriateness of abortion" 143 pervades the "atmosphere" and presumably affects the attitudes and conduct of its
employees.
Second, HHS reasoned that separate facilities are needed "to prevent existing or potential clients of Title X projects - as well as the
general public - from concluding that the government endorses abortion." 144 Clients who seek government-funded family planning services might think that the presence of abortion services or counseling
within the same facility signals a governmental endorsement of the
morality and appropriateness of abortion.
Third, according to HHS, physical separation is needed to prevent
indirect subsidies from the government-funded family planning project
to the abortion activities of the grantee. "Even where the strictest
accounting and charging of expenses is performed," HHS reasoned,
"shared facilities inevitably increase the likelihood that a violation will
occur, and lead to situations where the assertion that a program does
not 'include' abortion amounts to little more than an accounting fiction."14 5
139 Id. at 392.

140See id. at 396.
141 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 435-40, 456-59.
142 Standard of Compliance for Family Planning Services Projects, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,210,
33,211 (I987).
143 Id. at 33,212.
144 Id.

14SId. Indeed, HHS may have undersold its case. Even in theory, the sharing of joint and
common costs will have the effect of making the provision of abortions cheaper than it would
be without government funding of the family planning project.
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From entirely different ideological casts of mind, a Supreme Court
majority led by Justice Brennan and the Reagan Department of HHS
thus concluded that a thorough separation between governmentfunded programs and the activities of religion (in one case) and abortion (in the other) is required, and for the same reasons: indoctrination,
endorsement, and indirect subsidies. While the results may well be
extreme, one must concede that if the goal is "absolute[] " 14 6 prohibition
of government-sponsored or government-financed religious training or
abortion, the physical separation embodied in restriction (2) is a logical
requirement. At least, the logic is equally powerful, or equally unpersuasive, in the two contexts.
The problem with the pursuit of "absolute" separation is the effect
on constitutional interests on the other side of the balance, a problem
that received no attention from the Court in Grand Rapids and little
attention from HHS. Grand Rapids forced the parents of children
needing special services to choose between receiving those services (at
least in the most effective way) and abandoning religious education.
The title X regulations increased the cost to the grantee of providing
abortion-related services with its own money: the grantee now must
build and staff a separate facility, at considerable and (but for the
regulations) unnecessary expense. Thus, both cases resemble League
of Women Voters. Each goes beyond a mere refusal to fund and
conditions government benefits upon a private group's willingness to
forgo a constitutionally protected activity funded by its own resources.
Under the free speech clause, the Court has struck a middle ground
by upholding spending restrictions that impose a modest inconvenience
on the exercise of the right and condemning restrictions with a heavier
impact. In League of Women Voters and Taxation with Representation, the ultimate determination of constitutionality depended upon
the degree of burden in light of the alternative avenues of expression
available. 14 7 Applying this approach to Grand Rapids, the Court
should have assessed the difficulty of providing comparable educational services at neutral sites, as this is the measure of the burden
imposed by restriction (2). The record in the relevant Supreme Court
cases showed that between 29 and 42.5 percent of the entire budget
for the nonpublic portion of programs of this sort would be consumed
by noninstructional costs if the services could not be provided on
premises. 148 Testimony also indicated that off-premises programs
146 Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385.
147 Compare Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-46 (1983) (finding
that a tax provision forbidding substantial political lobbying by nonprofit organizations is
constitutional because another provision of the tax code permitted such organizations to establish
a separate affiliated entity that could engage in lobbying) with FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984) (striking down a law forbidding broadcasters from editorializing
apparently because it was impossible for such broadcasters to establish a separate affiliated
station to present editorials).
14s See Joint Appendix at 360, Grand Rapids (No. 83-990) (reporting effects in Grand Rapids);

SELECTIVE FUNDING

1031

would be pedagogically inferior and would increase problems of safety
and nonparticipation.1 49 This degree of burden should be considered
excessive.
Under title X, the Court should examine the burden imposed upon
grantees by the separate facilities requirement. Although precise statistics are unavailable, undoubtedly a substantial financial cost exists,
which, though it falls short of the impossibility in League of Women
Voters and probably of the burden in Grand Rapids, surely exceeds
50
the relatively mild inconvenience in Taxation with Representation.1
On the other hand, militating in favor of the HHS regulations (albeit
not conclusively) is the non-financial dimension of the case. More
important to abortion promoters than the economies of unified operations is access to clients who might not go to a facility devoted solely
to performing abortions and pro-abortion counseling. Realistically,
only those who have decided to obtain an abortion will go to an
abortionist, while many who are in doubt (including those who are
not yet pregnant) will go to a family planning clinic. By contrast,
those attending a religious school presumably have already made their
choice. Gathering a wider audience for the counseling of abortion is
a significant, and symbolically troublesome, form of assistance. It is
almost like allowing governmental programs to be administered at
church - after the sermon, of course.
C. Use of Public Facilities
There has been extensive litigation for more than forty years over
the rights of religious speakers and groups to use public property. In
virtually all such cases, the conclusion has been the same: it does not
violate the establishment clause to allow religious speakers and groups
to use public property on terms comparable to others, and it generally
violates the free speech or free exercise clause to forbid it. Thus, in
O'Hair v. Andrus,' 5 1 the District of Columbia Circuit held that it was
permissible to allow Pope John Paul II to conduct a mass before an
audience of approximately half a million on the National Mall. The
Catholic Archdiocese agreed to pay "any possible incremental sums
ascribable to the Mass as a religious worship," 15 2 including the building of the platform for the altar, and the expense of fencing, sound
Joint Appendix at 66-67, 68, Aguilar (No. 84-237) (reporting effects in St. Louis and New
York).
149 See Joint Appendix at 35-36, Aguilar (No. 84-237).
150 Compare Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 72-75 (Ist
Cir. i99o ) (invalidating the title X regulation on analogy to League of Women Voters), petition
for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3037 (U.S. June 8, 19go) (No. 89-1929) with New York v. Sullivan,
889 F.2d 401, 412-14 (2d Cir. x989) (upholding the title X regulation on analogy to Taxation
with Representation), cert. granted, 1io S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
Isl 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 2979).
152 Id. at 936.
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equipment, electrical facilities, portable toilets, first aid stations,
chairs, other physical facilities, over one thousand ushers and guides,
and clean-up after the event.' 5 3 The federal government provided the
site, as well as "police, sanitation, and related public services" similar
to those provided for other large assemblies in the park.' 5 4 The court
held that to permit the papal mass on those terms was neither aid to
nor endorsement of religion.' 5 5
Similarly, in Widmar v. Vincent,'5 6 the Supreme Court held that
it would not violate the establishment clause for a public university
to allow a student religious group to meet in university facilities that
were uniformly made available to other student groups. 157 The Court
reasoned that an "open forum" of this sort "does not confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.' 5 8 Even
though the university had a "compelling" interest in complying with
its constitutional obligation under the privacy-separation rationale to
avoid funding religion, the use of public facilities was not impermissible support. 159 Indeed, the Court held that absent a compelling
countervailing interest, equal access to the university's "open forum"
for religious groups was required by the free speech clause. 160 These
are not isolated decisions. There are at least a dozen cases in the
Supreme Court alone upholding the right of religious groups and
speakers to carry on their activities on public property on terms equal
to those imposed on other groups.161 No Supreme Court cases are to
the contrary.
In the abortion context, however, the Court has reached the opposite conclusion. In Webster, the Court held that a ban on the use
of public facilities is indistinguishable from a ban on direct funding.
"Having held that the State's refusal to fund abortions does not violate

153 See id.

at 933, 936.
154 Id. at 936.

155 See id. at 935-36.
156 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
157 The Court recently extended its reasoning to high school groups. See Board of Educ. v.

Mergens, 1o S. Ct. 2356, 2372-73 (199o).
1ss Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
159 Id. at 271.
160 See id. at 269.

161 See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1987);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981);
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69
(1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (195r); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
272-73 (195I); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5Ol, 504-05 (1946); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S.
418, 422 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416-17 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 578 (194); Schneider v. State (Town of Livingston), 3o8 U.S. 147, 157-65 (939);

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). See generally Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L.
REV. i, 9-35 (2986).
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Roe v. Wade," the Court said, "it strains logic to reach a contrary
result for the use of public facilities and employees."1 62 It is difficult
to see how the Court could reach such a conclusion in the face of
cases like O'Hair and Widmar, which prohibit direct funding of religion but require equal access to public facilities.
Providing access to public property is different from direct funding, for precisely the reason that differentiates penalties from mere
refusals to subsidize. A religious group or an abortionist who uses
public property for purposes compatible with its ordinary use does
not impose any additional costs on the public. 163 In Webster, for
example, the evidence showed that the patient paid "'all of the public
facility's costs in providing [the] abortion.""' 164 However, if the public
property had been off limits, the patient's cost would have exceeded
the cost of the abortion itself (because of the need to travel and related
complications, which could far exceed the cost of the abortion alone).
Therefore, under the analysis of Part I, a ban from access to public
facilities is unconstitutional because it is more than a mere refusal to
fund.
Moreover, it is not true, as the Court assumed in Webster, that
the refusal to allow abortions in public facilities "leaves a pregnant
woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate
any public hospitals at all."1 65 If the state had so chosen, there would
be more private hospitals at which abortions might be more readily
available. By the same token, if the state had chosen not to operate
any public schools, there would surely be more private schools, including more religious schools. In the extreme case, if all hospitals
were public, the ban on abortions in public facilities would be equivalent to a direct prohibition of all abortions that must be performed
in a hospital. The Webster Court conceded that "[a] different analysis
might apply if a particular State had socialized medicine and all of
its hospitals and physicians were publicly funded,"'1 66 but it failed to
recognize that partially socialized medicine has a similar, if less ex16 7
treme, effect.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 1a9 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989) (plurality opinion).
The same is not true for public employees who perform an abortion. The public employee
imposes a marginal cost on the public and uses time which could have been used for other
medical assistance.
164 Webster, iog S. Ct. at 3052 (quoting Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d
1071, 1083 (8th Cir. 1988)). This assumes that the hospital is not full. If it is full, the
performance of the abortion would displace another medical procedure, which would impose a
marginal cost.
162

163

165
166

Id.
Id. at 3052 n.8; cf. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and DoctrinalDe-

velopment, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 522-23 (1968) (arguing that in a collectivist state, which
owns and controls all resources, government "aid" to religion would be constitutionally required).
167 The issue may also be compared to the "state action" doctrine under the fourteenth
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I1. ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE UNDERLYING RIGHTS

The privacy-separation rationale of Roe and Lemon is not the only,
and may not be the best, understanding of the rights to choose abortion and religious education. Two prominent alternatives are, first,
the "anti-coercion" rationale, which holds that although the government may not use force or compulsion, it may use less coercive means
to induce individuals to adopt the socially preferred choices of childbirth and public education, and, second, the "relational rights" or
"equal protection" rationale, which holds that abortion rights and
religious freedom uphold systemic (and not merely individual) values
related to nonsubordination. The question is whether these alternative
rationales for the underlying rights require modifications in the analysis of the funding issue.
A. The Anti-Coercion Rationale
In Maher and Harris,the Court justified bans on abortion funding
on the ground that "the constitutional freedom recognized in [Roe]
and its progeny. . . did not prevent [the state] from making 'a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement[ing]

that judgment by the allocation of public funds."", 68 The Court must
have meant that the government's interest in protecting unborn life is
legitimate, but limited to non-coercive means. Although this conception is inconsistent with the privacy-separation rationale, 169 it is a
plausible alternative understanding of the abortion right.
Indeed, the anti-coercion rationale provides a more persuasive
reading of the precedents that supported Roe. One of the many
similarities in the debates over abortion and parochial schools is that
both rights trace their origin to the Supreme Court's famous 1925
amendment, where "liberal" Justices and commentators have tended to conclude more readily
that various contacts between the government and ostensibly private institutions (financial
assistance, presence on government property, and the like) require the attribution of private
decisions to the government. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1027-29 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 362 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 366-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (i96i). Thus, there is irony in Justice Blackmun's complaint in
Webster, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, that:
by defining "public facility" as "any public institution, public facility, public equipment,
or any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any agency of political
subdivision thereof," . . . the Missouri statute prohibits the performance of abortions in
institutions that in all pertinent respects are private, yet are located on property owned,
leased, or controlled by the government.
io9 S. Ct. at 3068 n.i (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Mo.
REV. STAT. § 188.200 (x986)).
168 Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (x977)); see also
Webster, io9 S. Ct. at 3052.
169 See supra pp. iooo-oi.
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decision, Pierce v. Society of Sisters.17 0 Pierce held unconstitutional
a state law requiring all parents to send their school-age children to
public schools on pain of criminal sanction for refusal. "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose," according to the Court, "excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only."'171 Pierce, in turn, relied on Meyer v.
Nebraska,172 in which the Court struck down a state law making it
criminal for anyone to teach modern languages other than English to
children who had not passed the eighth grade. Pierce and Meyer are
the charter of rights for those who prefer to send their children to
private, including religious, schools and (within limits) to control the
content of their curriculum. 1 73 While these decisions were originally
grounded in concerns about creation of a public orthodoxy (a concern
that now sounds in the first amendment rights of free speech and
religious freedom), more recently these decisions have been cited in
support of the broader claim of a right to autonomy in matters of
marriage, procreation, child-rearing, and family life - and thus as
174
the precedential pillars of Roe v. Wade.
The conception of rights in Pierce and Meyer, however, is different
from the privacy rationale of Roe. As discussed in Part 1, 175 Roe was
predicated on the government's lack of authority to resolve a question
of deep personal importance and public disagreement: the moral-legal
status of a being between conception and viability. Pierce and Meyer,
by contrast, were predicated on limits to the use of governmental
force, even when deployed to promote objectives within the government's legitimate authority.
Meyer is most explicit on this point. Nebraska's objective in prohibiting instruction of children in foreign languages was to promote
the English language and American ideals of citizenship. 176 In striking
down the Nebraska statute, the Supreme Court did not suggest that
these purposes are "private" matters, outside the proper domain of the
state. Instead, the Court held that "a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.' 17 7 Although the government could pursue its objectives by other means (including its control over the cur170 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

171 Id. at 535.
172 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

173 See Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARv. EDUC.
REV. 76, 77 (1976) (discussing the centrality of Pierce).
174 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (citing Pierce and Meyer as protecting "child
rearing and education"); id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Pierce and Meyer as protecting "personal choice in matters of marriage and family life").
171 See supra pp. 994-96.
176 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 4ox.
177 Id.
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riculum of public schools), 17 8 the Meyer Court forbade the use of the
ultimate governmental weapon of coercion: "Perhaps it would be
highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary
speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with
the Constitution."

179

An anti-coercion understanding of constitutional rights is not uncommon in cases involving a clash of opinions. In West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 8 0 the Supreme Court held that the
state may not punish schoolchildren for refusing to join the flag salute.
This did not mean, however, that the state was prohibited from
encouraging the flag salute and the values it represents. Similarly, in
the most recent flag-burning decision, United States v. Eichman,'8
Justice Brennan distinguished between "creat[ing] national symbols,
promot[ing] them, and encourag[ing] their respectful treatment," and
"criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely com18 2
municative impact."
Under the anti-coercion rationale, there can be no constitutional
objection if the government funds public schools but not private religious schools. As Professor Cass Sunstein has observed, if the present law on private school funding is correct, it is because the right
recognized in Pierce "is not a right to government neutrality in general
or in the abstract, but instead merely a right to be free from criminal
coercion in the private education of one's children." 8 3 Under the
Pierce anti-coercion conception, there is no constitutional impediment
to a governmental policy that makes a "value judgment" in favor of
public over private schools.' 8 4 The government is entitled to encourage matriculation at public schools and discourage it at private
schools, just as the government may encourage the learning and use
of English and discourage foreign language education. One permissible way to do so is to subsidize one and not the other.
A similar anti-coercion construction can be applied to the abortion
right.' 8 5 Much of the passion of the pro-choice position stems from
178See id. at 402 (referring approvingly to "the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for
institutions which it supports").
179 Id. at 401.
180 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
181 11O S. Ct. 2404 (199o).
182 Id. at 2409; see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting) (arguing that government may not prohibit the teaching of pacifism, although it has
the authority to promote the contrary view).
183 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 341.
184 Cf. Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (stating that the state may prefer childbirth over abortion).
185 Professor Michael Perry's well-known article arguing that the Supreme Court was "plainly
wrong" in the Hyde Amendment case, see Perry, supra note 24, appears to be predicated on
the judgment that Roe limits governmental ends rather than governmental means:
Once one concedes to government the authority to take action - any action (including
a refusal to subsidize abortion), whether or not "unduly burdensome" - predicated on
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a perception that anti-abortion laws force women to perform an arduous and intrusive service against their will. The most powerful
analogy is to enslavement.18 6 The point is not that preserving unborn
life is an improper governmental purpose, but that the government
cannot force women to bear the burden of pregnancy in order to
achieve that purpose. In A Defense of Abortion, 8 7 Judith Jarvis
Thomson analogized anti-abortion laws to kidnapping a person for
nine months in order to sustain the life of a famous violinist. There
appears to be no quarrel with the proposition that the government
could legitimately assist the violinist and use tax monies for that
purpose; it could hire someone to perform the necessary services. The
argument is only that the government cannot dragoon individuals
against their will.' 8 8 It follows from this conception of the abortion
right that the government may take steps short of legal compulsion
to protect unborn life. 189
An anti-coercion rationale for the abortion right would, like the
privacy rationale, prevent the government from criminalizing the performance of abortions. But it would permit the government to take
various steps to encourage women to eschew abortion - either by
taking more effective precautions to avoid pregnancy or by carrying
their fetuses to term. Among the more obvious steps in such a strategy
would be public education about embryological development; focused
counseling for women contemplating abortion (including accurate information about fetal development and about public and private re-

the view that abortion is per se morally objectionable, it necessarily follows . . . that a
woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy is not only less weighty than government's
interest in preventing abortion, but that it is not constitutionally protected at all - that
it has no constitutional status.
Id. at 1117-18 (emphasis in original). Professor Perry does not explain from whence this
principle derives, though his analogies to other constitutional areas, including free speech, see
id. at II 18-20, suggest that it is not a peculiarity of Roe. Unless the examples I have discussed
(Pierce, Meyer, Eichman, Bob Jones) were wrongly decided, it is simply not true that the
government necessarily lacks the power to attempt in non-coercive ways to discourage constitutionally protected behavior that the government views as immoral, unpatriotic, distasteful, or
unhealthy. It would not follow, for example, that just because "hate speech" is constitutionally
protected, a public university would be foreclosed from taking "action - any action" to discourage it. Without this unsupportable assumption, Perry's argument fails.
186 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 1o9 S. Ct. 3040, 3077 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing anti-abortion legislation as
"conscript[ing] a woman's body"); Tribe, supra note 27, at 337 (suggesting there is a "strong
parallel between a woman's right not to remain pregnant and every person's inalienable right
not to be enslaved").
187 Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (197).
18 See Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1569, 1571-i6ro (1979) (applying
good samaritan law to the abortion context).
1s9 Indeed, Professor Tribe devotes a section of his article against Harristo the proposition
that the government should (and may have a constitutional duty to) protect the unborn in ways
that do not invade the freedom of their mothers. See Tribe, supra note 27, at 340-43.
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sources available to assist them and their babies); 190 reasonable waiting periods; 19 1 improved public and private support for pregnant
women and infants (medical care, nutrition, housing, education, and
other necessary services); greater publicity about the ease of adoption
(including a public commitment to care for unwanted infants without
exception); consumer-oriented regulation of abortion providers to
guard against misrepresentation and misinformation; measures to
guard against pro-abortion coercion by husbands, boyfriends, parents,
and others who exercise power over the pregnant woman; better
enforcement of paternal child support obligations; and clear articulation of the moral principle that abortion is not an acceptable means
of birth control. And, of course, the state would pay the full cost of
childbirth for those who could not afford it, but abortion costs would
not be paid (except where the mother's life was endangered or in the
case of another appropriate exception). In short, abortion could be
treated as a personally and socially destructive activity, to be discouraged though not banned.
Under an anti-coercion rationale, the government's refusal to fund
abortions or private religious schools is unobjectionable, because the
underlying rights have to do with unconstitutional means (coercion)
rather than the ends that government can pursue. Thus, under this
92
conception both Harris and Lemon were rightly decided.1
B. The Relational Rights or Equal ProtectionRationale
Recent constitutional scholarship has tended to move away from
the privacy rationale for Roe and toward theories grounded in equal
protection. The critical fact, according to this view, is that pregnancy
is a burden on the woman's ability to pursue an equal and autonomous
economic and social life and a principal cause of the subordination
and dependency of women. Given the technical feasibility of abortion,
it is said that pregnancy-related disabilities are no longer "natural";
with a right to abortion, women are able, albeit at some physical,
psychological, and financial cost, to avoid the burdens of childbirth
and child-rearing. Their situation therefore becomes closer to a man's.
Laws forbidding abortion, then, are a form of legally imposed inequality and subordination. They protect the privileged position of
men and deny women the right they would otherwise have to control
193
their bodies and make choices about their futures.
190 This would require reconsideration of portions of City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 46, 443-44 (1983).
191 Likewise, this would require reconsideration of Akron. See id. at 449-51.
192 That is, Lemon's implicit rejection of the free exercise claim was right; the anti-coercion
rationale does not support the establishment clause holding in the case.
193 For elaboration of this equal protection approach to abortion rights, see, for example, C.
MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987); L. TRIBE, supra note 22, § iS-xo, at
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This conception of the abortion right provides a stronger basis for
the claim that the Hyde Amendment is unconstitutional because it is
not predicated on the government's noninvolvement in a "private"
matter. This approach has taken two forms: the "relational rights"
argument and a more doctrinally orthodox equal protection argument.
This section will consider these views and their analogous use in the
religious school context.
i. Relational Rights. -

The relational rights argument has been

most fully developed by Professor Laurence Tribe. 194 Tribe distinguishes between rights that are individual, alienable, and negative
and rights that "correspond to systemic norms - norms concerned
with structuring power relationships to avoid the creation or perpetuation of hierarchy in which some perennially dominate others."195
These "relational" rights, he explains, are necessarily inalienable. Because individuals are "not their sole focus," individuals have no right
to waive them.' 96 And because these rights are not waivable, it
follows that an individual's failure to summon forth the material
resources necessary for their exercise cannot be a ground for waiver:
the failure of the government to provide the aid necessary to exercise
1 97
the right "amounts to enforced alienation of the underlying right."
Therefore, Tribe concludes, "government must be recognized as having an affirmative duty to protect such rights from the distortions of
a purely private market - to lift them beyond the status of commodities that individuals may freely buy and sell provided they have
acquired and retained the necessary wealth." 19 8
Professor Tribe's argument proves too much. Virtually every if not every - right protected by the Constitution has a "relational"
or "systemic" dimension. Freedom of the press, for example, exists at
least as much for the purpose of protecting our democratic institutions
as it does for the private interests of the barons of the press. And it
might well be that the right is inalienable (to the government, that
is). Perhaps it is unconstitutional for the government to buy a newspaper in order to suppress its views, but it does not follow that the
government's refusal to subsidize newspapers "amounts to enforced
alienation of the underlying right" or that there is any "affirmative
1353-56; Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C.L. REV. 375, 382-86 (1985); Karst, The Supreme Court, r976 Term - Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 9x HARV. L. REV. I, 57-59 (1977); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, zo16-28 (1984); and Olsen, The
Supreme Court, z988 Term - Comment: Unraveling Compromise, io3 HARV.L. REv. 105, 11726 (1989).
194

See Tribe, supra note 27, at 330-35.

19SId. at 332-33.
196 Id. at 333.
197 Id.

198 Id. at 333-34.
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duty" on the part of the government to pay for its exercise. Indeed,
no example beyond that in this Article is necessary to expose the
weakness in Professor Tribe's position. He states, and I agree, that
along with much of the Constitution, the establishment clause "can
be viewed as resting on relational norms and on the need for deliberate
diffusion of power to combat the hegemony of any single group or
faction." 199 The establishment clause forbids governmental action
with the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. But even
Tribe denies that this right, "relational" though it may be, entails an
"affirmative duty" on the part of government to subsidize its exercise
for those who cannot afford it.200 The problem is that Tribe provides
no basis for distinguishing between relational rights that do require
funding and relational rights that do not require funding.
2. Equal Protection. It is more persuasive to cast the abortion
right in standard equal protection terms. The reason for heightened
judicial scrutiny of abortion laws, according to this theory, is not that
those laws invade "privacy" rights, but that they are directed exclusively at women, giving rise to the apprehension that they may reflect
a conscious or unconscious bias against women or in favor of the
subordination of women. If so, laws refusing to fund abortions are
subject to heightened scrutiny for precisely the same reason - they
directly affect women only.
This equal protection rationale, if accepted, would provide a
stronger basis for claiming a constitutional right to funding of abortions under Medicaid than is provided by the privacy-separation rationale. As discussed in Part 1,201 the privacy rationale provides the
justification for the refusal to fund: the government must be agnostic
about abortion in the face of national dissension. The equal protection
rationale for strict scrutiny of anti-abortion laws, on the other hand,
is fully consistent with strict scrutiny of laws like the Hyde Amendment.
Nonetheless, the argument against Harris under the equal protection rationale, while more plausible, remains problematic. First, it is
not clear that established equal protection doctrine truly supports a
theory of abortion rights. To be sure, the immediate impact of a
proscription on abortion falls only on women. But the effects on men
are substantial as well. Having a child changes a man's life as well
as a woman's. Both married and unmarried men have been known
to resist the responsibilities of unintended fatherhood. Abortion is
often their most convenient "out." Indeed, I suspect that in a not

199 Id. at 333 n.14.
200 See id. at 333-34 & n.15.
201 See supra pp. ioo6-ii.
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insignificant number of cases it is the man, more than the woman,
who feels threatened by the advent of a child and is more likely to
view the fetus as an inconvenient abstraction rather than as a baby.
This may help to explain why, in polling data, men consistently
support abortion rights in somewhat larger numbers than do
women.202
Thus, abortion regulations do not present the classic case for strict
scrutiny, where the dominant majority benefits at the expense of a
minority. Anti-abortion laws are contrary to the immediate interests
of both men and women. Whatever else may be said about them,
anti-abortion laws serve no one's selfish interest; they extend protection
to a class of helpless third parties, the unborn, at the expense of those
in power, both men and women. Indeed, to the extent that equal
protection theory asks the legal system to be especially alert to the
interests of the weaker, more vulnerable, politically unrepresented
members of society, it should cut against abortion rights, because the
unborn meet that description far more clearly than any other protected
class.
Moreover, even if the class of persons disadvantaged by antiabortion laws were exclusively female, that would not be sufficient
under established equal protection doctrine to trigger strict scrutiny.
In Geduldig v. Aiello,20 3 for example, the Court held that the failure
of a state's disability insurance plan to cover costs associated with
pregnancy and childbirth did not discriminate against women in violation of the equal protection clause. While the majority's argument
was not particularly persuasive, the result could be correct. When
the government is legislating with respect to a matter otherwise within
its cognizance through the use of classifications naturally and inextricably tied to racial or sexual differences, there is no entirely satisfactory way to determine whether the classification is discriminatory.
For example, rape laws apply by their nature almost exclusively to
males, but this does not make those laws constitutionally suspect.
The best one can do in these cases is to engage in speculative
counterfactuals: for example, would pregnancy be included in the
benefit package if men got pregnant?2 0 4 The restriction in Geduldig
would likely fail this test. There are differences between pregnancy
and other disabilities (pregnancy is generally a matter of choice; other
disabilities are not), but those differences are not so overwhelming as
202 See H. RODMAN, B. SARvis & J. BoNAR, THE ABORTION QUESTION 141-43 (1987).

For

corroborating data, see the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago,
General Social Survey cumulative data file (1972-1989).
203 417 U.S. 484 (,974).

204 See Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935,
993 (1989).
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to dispel the suspicion that an indifference to a condition unique to
205
women may have been a strong motivating factor.
Putting aside the burden that unintended parenthood places on
males, the Hyde Amendment raises the same question as the failure
to include pregnancy in the disability benefits program: the direct and
immediate impact falls exclusively on females. But as in Geduldig,
this does not end the analysis. We must engage in a speculative
counterfactual: would abortion be treated in the same way if men became pregnant? A negative answer to this seems to be an article of
faith among the pro-choice movement ("if men got pregnant, abortion
would be a sacrament"); but this overlooks the fact that women, who
do get pregnant, are more - not less - likely than men to support
restrictions on abortion. 20 6 The predominant purpose of modern abortion restrictions is to protect unborn life. We cannot convincingly
attribute this commitment (questionable though it may be on other
grounds) to a purpose of subordinating women. Given the inconvenience
(albeit unequal) of unintended parenthood to both men and women, it
is inconceivable that even the most sexist of legislatures would pass an
anti-abortion law if it were not for a good faith concern for fetal life.
This is not to deny that a variety of factors influence attitudes
toward abortion. For some, these include the belief that motherhood
is a natural and important part of a woman's life and that elevation
of abortion to a constitutional right is an assault on that understanding. But if public policies could be adjudged guilty by association, it
is not obvious that support for abortion funding would survive constitutional scrutiny any more easily than would opposition to it. Some
middle-class Americans support abortion, and especially Medicaid
funding of abortion, as a way to decrease the number of poor and
minority children born into the world and thus to reduce the cost of
welfare and the incidence of crime. Some males support abortion
rights because of their perception that women should be sexually
available, with no attendant commitment on their part.2 0 7 As Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out, the two causes most heavily
supported by the Playboy Foundation are abortion rights and opposition to pornography laws. 20 8 And some supporters of women's rights

205 Congress reversed the result in Geduldig by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2oooe(k) (1988)).
206 See supra p. 1O41.
207 Professor Catharine MacKinnon has observed:
Under conditions in which women do not control access to our sexuality, [abortion]
facilitates women's heterosexual availability. In other words, under conditions of gender
inequality, sexual liberation in this sense does not free women, it frees male sexual
aggression. The availability of abortion thus removes the one remaining legitimized
reason that women have had for refusing sex besides the headache. As Andrea Dworkin
puts it, analyzing male ideology on abortion: "Getting laid was at stake."
MacKinnon, supra note 53, at 5I (quoting A. DWORKIN, RIGHT WING WOMEN 98-99 (I98)).
208 See id.
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are among the ranks of the pro-lifers 20 9 (a popular bumper-sticker
reads "Equal Rights for Unborn Women"). The constitutionality of
abortion funding restrictions should not be decided on the basis of the
purity of attitude to be found among the contending forces. It is more
charitable -

and also more accurate -

to accept at face value the

predominant concern of both sides, whether that concern is for the
rights of women or for the lives of the unborn.
Moreover, even if we conclude that the equal protection theory
provides a superior doctrinal rationale for the abortion right itself, it
does not necessarily support the right to funding. Even straightforward, facial discrimination is justifiable upon sufficient showing of
governmental necessity. The governmental interest supported by the
Hyde Amendment is to ensure that taxpayers who conscientiously
believe that abortion is the taking of innocent human life are not
coerced into paying for it. Nothing in the equal protection rationale
casts doubt on the strength or legitimacy of that interest.
The parallel argument in the religious context would be a theory
of the religion clauses under which the first amendment is designed
for the special protection of minority religions. 2 10 In the same way
that feminist theories of equal protection are based at times on the
need to permit women to participate fully and equally in spheres of
life previously reserved to men and at times on the need to recognize
2 11
the equal importance of women's distinctive needs and perspectives,
minority religious groups at times focus on the right to full participation as equal citizens in public life and at times on the need to
maintain an identity separate and distinct from the majority.
It is no accident that religious school systems have been developed
by minority religious groups who feel threatened by the prevailing
ideology (once Protestant, now secularist) of the public schools. These
separate school systems have been an important means for maintaining
religious identity and avoiding an unwelcome assimilation, while still
developing the skills necessary for participation in modern American
life. Parochial schools have been the creation of the minority and
their refuge from majoritarianism. Lemon, like its popularly adopted
precursors in many state constitutions forbidding aid to religious
schools, protects the majority at the expense of the minority. The
majority gets the schools that it wants, using tax dollars extracted
from everyone; minority religious groups are forced to support the
majority's school systems and also to pay for their own. If the purpose
209 See Callahan, Value Choices inAbortion, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES
285 (S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 1984); Amicus Curiae Brief of Feminists for Life of
America, Webster (No. 88-6o5).
210 See Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, ioo HARv. L. REv. 1607, 1648
n.38 (1987) (comparing feminist jurisprudence to a focus on minority religions under the first
amendment).
211 For a review and assessment of these strands of feminist equal protection theory, see
Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 201, 228-37.
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of the religion clauses is to protect the position of minority faiths to prevent their forced assimilation and their exploitation at the hands
of the majority - Lemon is not simply unsupportable but perverse.
Moreover, a much stronger argument can be made that denial of
funding to private religious schools is the result of purposeful discrimination against minority religions. The historical evidence is powerful
that the public school movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was a self-conscious attempt to spread Protestant values
among the people, especially among immigrant groups with different
religious backgrounds. 2 12 Although the religious intentions of the
movement are rarely acknowledged today, at the time these were
addressed openly. Typical was this comment by Horace Mann, the
leader of the movement:
All those who are worthily laboring to promote the cause of education
are laboring to elevate mankind into the upper and purer regions of
civilization, Christianity, and the worship of the true God; all those
who are obstructing the progress of this2 1cause
are impelling the race
3
backwards into barbarism and idolatry.
Protestantism was popularly associated with Americanism, and Catholicism was widely considered to be anti-democratic, disloyal, degraded, superstitious, and generally "un-American. ''2 14 This manifested itself in two ways. First, the public school system was imbued
212 See C. GLENN, THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 146-78, 205-06 (1988); C. KAEsTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-i86o, at
75-103 (1983); J. SARNA, AMERICAN JEWS AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 18-25 (1989); see
also Lott, An Explanationfor Public Provision of Schooling: The Importance of Indoctrination,
33 J.L. & ECON. 299 (iggo) (arguing that indoctrination is the primary purpose of public
education).
213 Common School J., Jan. 1, 1846, at 15 (authored by Horace Mann), quoted in C. GLENN,
supra note 212, at 171-72. While opposing introduction of what he called "sectarian instruction
or sectarian books" into the public schools, H. MANN, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 59 (1841), quoted in C. GLENN, supra note 212, at 164, Mann
claimed that "[m]oral training, or the application of religious principles to the duties of life,"
should be the "inseparable accompaniment" to education. H. MANN, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 157 (1846), quoted in C. GLENN, supra note 212, at 165.
"Nonsectarian" religious education "was in reality nondenominational Protestantism." D. RAyITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 9 (1974); accord C. GLENN, supra note 212, at 132.
214 The virulence of anti-Catholic feeling during this period is difficult for a person of today
to imagine. For historical accounts, see S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 558-63, 852-54 (1972); R. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE i8oo-i86o,
at 345-79 (1938); and M. SCHWARTZ, THE PERSISTENT PREJUDICE: ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN
AMERICA 38-IO (1984). Prominent works contending that Catholicism is antithetical to American values include L. BEECHER, PLEA FOR THE WEST 66-68 (1835); J. STRONG, OUR COUNTRY:
ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISIS 46-59 (1885); and R. THOMPSON, THE PAPACY
AND THE CrIL POWER 56-59 (1876). The anti-Catholic political movement included such
notables as Presidents Grant and Hayes and presidential candidate James G. Blaine, all of
whom made denial of funding to parochial schools a major part of their political programs. See
D. RAVITCH, supra note 213; M. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 66-70.
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with Protestant values, including prayers, Bible readings from the
King James version, and overt religious teachings. 2 15 Second, socalled "sectarian" (meaning Catholic) schools were discouraged, denied
any share in public funding, and even outlawed. 2 16 Selective funding
was part and parcel of Protestant hegemonism in nineteenth and early
twentieth century America.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that there is a judicially
enforceable constitutional right to public funding today. It would be
difficult to prove that the government's only reason for continuing to
refuse to fund religious schools is to induce religious assimilation and
homogenization. Indeed, a more important reason is that the courts
have told them such funding would be unconstitutional. There are
also plausible reasons, unrelated to hostility to religion, that persuade
some persons of good will that public schools are superior to private
schools, including private religious schools. 2 17 The discriminatory origins of the anti-funding position do not necessarily vitiate legitimate
reasons for keeping it in place. 218 Moreover, the federal courts should
be reluctant to order so sweeping a modification in so important and
long-standing a public institution as the public school system, 2 19 although this does not diminish the constitutional responsibility of state
legislatures to correct their policies.
The reluctance to achieve change through judicial intervention in
this area should be especially strong because the underlying constitutional theory - that the religion clauses should be interpreted to
protect the position of minority religions - is so indeterminate. There
are many claims upon governmental resources that would facilitate
the survival and flourishing of minority religions, many of whose
members are less affluent than the majority. But it is hard to believe
that the free exercise clause is simply an entitlement to government
funding of whatever religious activities minority faiths might desire.
215 See C. MOONEY, BOUNDARIES DIMLY PERCEIVED: LAW, RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND

THE COMMON GOOD 52 (199o) ("[Public schools] represented not a secularizing influence but a
patriotic and civilizing influence, into which the Protestants who controlled them could inject
the teachings, practices, and especially the morality of the mainline churches."); Dolan, Freedom
of Religion and American Catholicism, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 67, 68 (H. Clark
ed. 1982) ("Highly moral in purpose and visibly religious in practice, public education was
schooling in a sectarian Protestant value system."); see also C. GLENN, supra note 212, at 14678 (discussing the influence of Protestant beliefs and practices over public education); J. SARNA,
sura note 212, at 18-25 (same).
216 See C. GLENN, supra note 212, at 219-34; J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 28-29, 59-60 (1955).

The laws struck down

in Pierce and Meyer were products of this movement.
217 See supra p. 1013.
218 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444 (i961) (upholding Sunday closing laws on
the ground that they now have secular justifications even though their origins were religious).
219 See generally R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 22-26 (1989) (defending a restrained judicial role).
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The feminist equal protection theory and the "minority religions"
theory of the first amendment share an analytical weakness: neither
provides sufficient guidance about the contours of constitutional rights.
Both theories provide useful insight and perspective into the purpose
of constitutional doctrine, but neither tells the judge what is forbidden
or what is required. These theories provide more of a political program than a "satisfactory and workable general standard to be applied
by judges. 2 20 It cannot be true that the Constitution requires all
actions that benefit (most) women and forbids whatever disadvantages
them. The same goes for the needs and desires of minority religions.
In the end, these theories can help account for the constitutional
protections, but they need to be supplemented with more concrete
doctrines. They do not, then, provide a compelling basis for rejecting
Harris or Lemon, even if they provide reasons for disquietude with
the results.

IV. TOwARD

AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTIVE FUNDING

Two distinct bases for challenging selective funding have emerged
from the preceding discussion of abortions and parochial schools.
First, a government program may be unconstitutional if it funds a
substitute for a constitutionally protected choice without also funding
the individual's preferred choice. Only if there is a plausible basis for
the selective funding, predicated on a reason that is not objectively
hostile to the right in question (that is, a reason that can be accepted,
in principle, even by supporters of the right), is it permissible for the
government to fund one choice but not the other.
The corollary of this principle is that the government is under no
obligation to fund a constitutionally protected activity merely because
it funds other activities, if those other activities are either complements
to, or unrelated to, the constitutionally protected right. Only if the
constitutional right involves the freedom to choose between two or
more alternatives will this principle have any application. There is
no obligation to fund abortions merely because the government funds
heart transplants or flu vaccinations, or religion classes merely because
the government funds English and math. But there is a presumptive
obligation to fund abortions when the government funds childbirth,
and to fund religious schools when it funds secular schools, unless
there is a plausible, non-hostile reason for the selective funding. In
the case of abortion, I believe there is such a reason: providing medical
assistance at childbirth is important to the health and safety of the
newborn infant, a purpose with which we all agree. In the case of
220 Becker, supra note 21x, at 247; see also C. MACKINNON, supra note 193, at 40 (arguing
that the "task [of the feminist analysis] is not to formulate abstract standards that will produce
determinate outcomes in particular cases").
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religious schools there may be such a reason, albeit somewhat tenuous:
that public schools may in some instances be more economically,
socially, racially, and ideologically diverse than private schools, and
that this diversity is an important aspect of training for citizenship in
a pluralistic United States.
The second basis for objecting to selective government funding
applies when the government goes beyond a refusal to pay the costs
of exercising a constitutional right and imposes an additional loss on
those exercising the right. A series of Supreme Court cases demonstrates that the government need not subsidize an individual's free
speech, but it cannot deprive him of valuable benefits merely because
he has spoken. By the same token, the government could not deny
all Medicaid benefits to a woman who procures an abortion, even
though it need not pay the cost of the abortion itself. And the government should not be able to deny all education funding to families
who seek a religious component in their children's education, even
though it need not (and, under the establishment clause, may not) pay
the incremental cost of the religious component itself.
These two approaches establish only a prima facie case for challenging the selective funding. The government may still prevail if it
has a legitimate (perhaps compelling) purpose unrelated to hostility to
the right. In the abortion and school funding contexts, the principal
governmental interest is to protect the rights of those who consider it
a violation of conscience to support either abortions or religious training. The consequence of this interest, however, is different in the two
contexts. The Hyde Amendment is narrowly drawn to accomplish
the purpose of ensuring that unwilling taxpayers are not forced to pay
for abortions, but Lemon is vastly overbroad. Under Lemon, the state
not only refuses to pay for religious training; it also refuses to pay for
secular education for students who want to add a religious element at
their own expense.
Analysis of selective funding programs thus requires both an intensive inquiry into the nature of the constitutional rights involved,
including the government's countervailing interests, if any, and a
general theory that identifies when rights are threatened by selective
funding. In this Article I have attempted to provide both: a careful
consideration of the basis for abortion rights and the right to choose
religious schools, with alternative rationales, and a general theory of
selective funding. Neither element is dispensable. A general theory
of funding does not, and cannot, tell us the contours of the constitutional right; and an understanding of the nature of the right does not
reveal when the refusal to fund is permissible or impermissible.
Some commentators have contended that there is no general doctrine of unconstitutional conditions that can help in these cases. 22 1 To
221 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 28, at 244; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 6o9-Io, 615-20;
Sunstein, supra note 62, at 339-44.
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the extent they remind us that the general doctrine is insufficient in
itself - that it does not eliminate the need for a particular analysis
of the constitutional rights involved - they are correct. As this Article
has shown, viewing the abortion right as a privacy right carries one
implication for funding issues; viewing it as an anti-coercion or equal
protection right has different implications. The same is true of religious schools. But to say that a general theory plays no part is to
deny that similarly conceived rights must be treated in the same way
and to allow judges who favor educational choice and oppose abortion
rights to go one way and judges who favor abortion rights and oppose
educational choice to go the other.
Professor Cass Sunstein contends that "the very idea of a unitary
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a product of the view that the
common law is the ordinary course and that government 'intervention'
the regulatory state - is exceptional." 22 2 This view, I think, is
profoundly mistaken. Under a minimalist state there is little need for
an unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The function of an unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to preserve certain protected constitutional liberties in an environment of pervasive governmental activity.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not in opposition to the
modern welfare-regulatory state; it is the constitutionalism of the welfare-regulatory state.
Professor Sunstein also claims that the question whether the denial
of funds is a "penalty" or a "refusal to subsidize" "is almost impossible
to sort out." 223 Instead the question is "whether the governmental
action at issue intrudes on the relevant right in a constitutionally
troublesome way."2 24 This begs the question: what is a "constitutionally troublesome way"? To answer this question requires articulation
of a theory. Nor is it sufficient simply to "ask[] whether . . . the
government has constitutionally sufficient justifications for affecting
constitutionally protected interests."2 2 5 How strong need the justifications be? How strict the scrutiny? When is it "sufficient" that the
taxpayers, through their representatives, have determined that they
prefer not to spend their money in that fashion, or that other public
purposes have a higher priority? Without a general theory, these
questions will be at the mercy of inconsistent and subjective judgments.
Professor Michael Seidman goes still further. He states that the
selective funding problem, which he calls the "coercive offer problem,"
seems "difficult because it can be resolved only by reference to norms
and conceptions that cannot be derived from the constitutional
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 595.
Sunstein, supra note 62, at 343.
224 Id.
225Sunstein, supra note 21, at 595.
222

223
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text." 226 He states that any solution to this problem "therefore brings
into question the underlying legitimacy of prevailing textual theories
of constitutional analysis" 22 7 and suggests that judges and lawyers
should engage in "perpetual context shifting"2 28 to "free themselves
from the way things are and to imagine the different world that we
[apparently meaning judges] might create." 2 29 In his view, the selective funding problem becomes not merely difficult, but incoherent, a
conclusion that leads to a call for abandonment of consistency.
I do not think a careful study of actual selective funding problems
reveals such incoherence. In this Article, I have identified two "constitutionally troublesome ways" for the government to allocate its
resources: to fund only one of two or more mutually exclusive, constitutionally protected choices, and to deny benefits to those who
exercise a constitutional right beyond making them bear the direct
cost of that exercise. I have, moreover, applied this analysis to two
of the most seemingly intractable examples of selective funding, abortion and religious schooling. I believe that this general theory, coupled
with the specifications of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, has yielded results that can be assessed objectively. If correct,
this approach is superior to any conclusory or subjective approach.
If incorrect, it should be replaced with a better theory, which would
take the form of either alternative understandings of the rights or
modifications in the general theory. To have no theory at all invites
ad hoc decisionmaking and unfairness.
Resistance to a doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is found on
both the left and the right of the jurisprudential spectrum. It comes
both from those, like Professor Seidman, who profess to find constitutional law indeterminate and therefore open to social change through
judicial creativity, and from those, like Chief Justice Rehnquist 230
(and Justice Holmes in an earlier era 2 3 1), who emphasize the demo-

cratic element in our constitutional system and who are reluctant to
impose constitutional constraints on the allocative decisions of the
representative branches. The common element of the left and the
right is their tendency to undervalue the constitutional text, the former
in favor of judicial, and the latter in favor of democratic, discretion.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, by contrast, belongs to
226 Seidman, Reflections on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. REV. 73, 76 (1988).
227 Id.
228Id. at 82.
229Id. at 84.
230 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (z987) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.).
231 See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 6oi-o2 (1926)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 52-53 (I9o0) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Davis, i62 Mass. 52o, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895) (Holmes,
J.), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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an intermediate jurisprudential tradition of constitutionalism, in which
the powers and discretion of both democratic and judicial decisionmakers are defined by the constitutional text, understood as a reasonably determinate and accessible set of principles.
The new critics of a doctrine of unconstitutional conditions do not
seek a return to an ideology of judicial restraint and majoritarianism.
They join in repudiating the old arguments - the right-privilege
distinction, the greater-includes-the-lesser argument, and the exclusive
focus on common law entitlements - that once were used to justify
deference to selective funding schemes enacted by representative bodies. The new critics do not desire a restoration of the Holmes-Rehnquist position. Instead they claim that the doctrine is incoherent, an
anachronism that cannot provide answers to today's constitutional
questions. The difficulty with their position is that it calls on us to
replace the older tradition of judicial restraint with little more than
intuitions tailored to each individual constitutional right, without regard to consistency of methodology.
The difficulty with the conservative-democratic position (which in
an earlier era was the progressive-democratic position) is that it sweeps
too broadly, impeding not only usurpations of legislative power by the
judiciary but also legitimate invocations of constitutional rights. Restraint is an admirable attribute in a judge, but deference to the
legislature does a disservice to the Constitution when the Constitution
is intended to limit legislative power. In the modern welfare-regulatory state, much of the power of government lies in its ability to
allocate burdens and benefits, short of criminal sanction or invasion
of common law rights. If the allocation of burdens and benefits were
free from constitutional scrutiny, much of the constitutional structure
of individual rights and limited government would become irrelevant.
Today, a doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is an indispensable
part of constitutionalism.
The questions of abortion funding and religious school funding
illustrate not just the utility of, but also the need for, a consistent
theory of selective funding. Given the intense ideological passions
generated by these questions, who can trust the mere mortals sitting
as article M judges to decide these questions dispassionately, if they
are free to address them on an ad hoc basis? It would be naive to
believe that complex constitutional theory is a perfect constraint on
politicized judging, but I am confident that a judge forced to develop
doctrine that would govern both abortion and religious education will
be more constrained, dispassionate, and fair-minded than one who
decides what seems fair in each case as it comes.

